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Ali ABSTRACT 01' TBB ftBS1S OF Bert. Lewis JUIlior Parrar for

the Master of Arb in History pre••at.ed April 14, 1971.

Tl Uel

Poreign Policy Deei.lou Which Led to Uai tad State.
Milit.ary Occupation of the DoaUnican Republie.

APPROVED BY MBMBBRS 01' THE TBBSIS COMMlftBB I

Preclerick NUDA, CbalrJ1lall

'1'0 achi... in4epen4ence, the Doa.inican Republic

had 1:0 tint endure three centw:1ea of haavy-hancled SpaD
iah rule and. period. of Haitian domination that. laated
for twenty-two yean.

!'ear of Haitian reconque8t., how...r,

conviDce4 the leacting Doaaiaican politicians that the new
aatiOD could not 10n9 endure without forelta protection.
Bncouraged by Domia1can offers of a naval ba•• , the
UDited State. t:oyed with tthe 14ea of expansion in the Car

ibbean aa early . . 1850, but civil war cut short the••

notions aDd allowed Spain t.o r .....rt control o".r her

Although Spanisb occupation ended in fail

former colony.

ure the UDited Snua bea_ lIOn

de~.ndD8d

that the

i.lud Republic should never avain be dominated by • Eur

opean power.

Such • determination on the part of tbe United Statee
to

pre'91lDt. European incursion led to an abortl ve annexa

t.ionist: at.teJlpt. by the Grant ac:'blini.t.ratloll in 1869 _d to
the •• t.abl:1.ahJlent. of a cuto.. noeiverehip ln 1905, when

UDpa:l.4 foreign debt. &rouse4 t:ha ire of European credi tx>r••

It

w.. hoped that the eatabliahment. of & austo. .

receivership would usber 1n a per10d of peace ud pros

perl ty for the Dominicans, but. by 1'12 :1. t beo_ a,,:1.dent

that. .uch hope. were not. t.o be r.a11.a4.

adbe..d

to the

,resldent. Wilson

argument that. forelgn intervention in the

Caribbean wa. not 1:0 be tolerated but. broadened Oni ted

State. inYolvement in the domestio policies of the Domini
can RepUblic by in.istinq OD the establishment of • con
stitut.ional deJBOCrac:y, whlah he f.lt would
tic uaaqu11ity.

.s~li.h d~

Wben it beaa.e appareat that the iDte.rnal

eoa41t1ona of the ialaad. Republic were Dot improvin9,

W11soD nluccant.ly ordered in the Unlt.ed 8t.at... Marine.
1D the hope. that. they would be able t.o educat.e the Doalin
iean. t:o the way. of dellOCracy.
By broadanil'l, the scope of tlDited State. involve·

aent ia the do.stio aftair. of t.he DofIliaioaD .Republic,

wilBon bad produoed an occupation that denied the Domini
cans the inherent right of a nation to gOY8rn itself, a
liberty whioh bad been maintained a,ainst overwhelming
odds durinq the preceding seventy-two years.
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AN INTRODUCTORY POLITICAL HISTORY

The island of Hispaniola was discovered in 1492 by
Christopher Columbus who took possession in the name of the
King and Queen of Spain.

From this date forth the island

was to be a victim of outside forces.

For over half a cen

tury the island was the capital of the Spanish empire in the
Americas.

with the discovery of gold and silver in Mexico

and Peru, however, her importance dwindled rapidly in the
eyea of the Spanish Crown.

By 1650 she had become an abused

power in Spain's wars with France and England and in 1697
the western portion of the island was formally ceded to
France.
Left to pursue her course in relative peace the Span
ish colony of Santo Domingo experienced a brief cultural
and economic revival by the middle of the eighteenth century.
By the end of the century, however, she found herself emersed

in the turmoil of the Haitian revolution and endured mili
tary occupations by the three great colonial powers of Spain,
France, and England.
In 1821 a conspiracy led by JOS' Nunez de c~ceres
expelled the Spanish authority and Santo Domingo waa declared
independent.

Within a matter of weeks, however, President

Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti declared the people of Santo
Domingo to be subject to the lawa of Haiti and occupied the
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country with troops.

Opposition steadily mounted and in

1844 the Haitian yoke was overturned and the Dominican
Republic was established.
From 1844 to the end of the century three men domin
ated Dominican history.

They were Pedro Santana, Buena

ventura B4ez, and Uli8.8 Beureaux.

/

Both Santana and Baez

feared Haitian reconquest and sought the assistance of
foreign powers in helping to maintain the Republic's inde
pendence from Haiti.

Tbe pursuit of such policies led to

the re-establishment of Spanish control frOll. 1861

to

1865

and aroused a greater determination by the United States
that the tiny Republic should never aqain be dominated by a
foreign power.

This attitude in turn produced an abortive

annexationist attempt by the Grant administration in 1869.
During the 1870's the tiny Republic reeled under a
aeries of revolts.

Not until 1882 was political stability

established under the rule of Ulises Heureaux.

His seven

teen years of dictatorial rule were cbaracterized by a sup
pression of Constitutional liberties and the accumulation
of a foreign debt that approximated thirty-two million
dollars by the time of bis assassination in 1899.

Chaos

followed Heureaux' death and the country went still deeper
in debt.

In order to stave off the

pos8ibili~y

of a

European intervention designed to collect money due their
nationals, the United States government, on the request of

3

Dominican President Carlos P. Morales, took over the col
lection of import duties throughout the Republic.
Under President RamOn C~ceres (1906-1911) prOgress
was made towares the liquidation of the foreign debt, poli
tical stability prevailed, constitutional reforms were
introduced and the economy began to prosper.
/

In 1911, how

ever, Caceres was assassinated and chaos returned.

In 1914

the united States government intervened to insure an honest
election and tried to persuade the new president, Juan
Isidro Ji~nez, to accept certain economic and political
reforms.

I
When Jimenez
was ousted by a revolution in 1916

President Wilson sent in United States Marines to occupy
the country.

Although well intentioned, the occupation,

which lasted until 1924, was ill received by the Dominicans
who wanted freedom rather than reforms in education, sani
tation and public works.

CHAPTER I
THE ANNEXATIONIST fEARS

In 1821, inspired by the efforts of SimOn Bol~var,
Dominicans succeeded in gaining their freedom from Spain.
Within a few short weeks, however, they were conquered by
neighboring Haiti who asserted her authority over them until
1844.

From the outset the Republic's second period of

independence was marked by political violence and insurrec
tion.

Added to her misery was the fact that from time to

time the Haitians attempted to restore their authority by
force.

Living in constant fear of Haitian invasion Domini

can politicians appealed abroad to the United States, France,
Spain, and Great 8ritain for protection.

While the United

States was engaged in Civil War Spain reannexed her former
colony only to withdraw in 1865 because of high occupation
costa and the decimation of her army by native upriSings
and yellow fever.

Though ahort-lived, Spanish intrusion

aroused a greater determination by the United States that
the Dominican Republic should never again be dominated by
a foreign power.

Washington's interest in repeated Domini

can offers of a treaty providing for annexation of the
Dominican Republic to the United States was spurred also
by the fact that the fine harbor at SamanA Bay was poten
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tially one of the most strategic positions in the West
Indies.
North American relations with the island of Hispan
iola commenced in the first decades of the eighteenth
century when Yankee skippers ventured forth into the Carib
bean Sea in search of trade.

This inter-imperial trade,

made possible by the abundant productivity of the British
colonies in America, was of course, illegal, but •
••• so strong were these trading instincts and
so rich were the rewards from this illicit com
merce that differences of race, religion, and
nationality were lightly regarded. Even the
many wars that vexed old Europe failed to destroy
these colonial connections. l
With the waning of Spanish power in the seventeenth
century, the Prench contrived to gain a foothold in the
western extremity of Hispaniola, efforts made by Spain to
dislodge them proved futile, and by the

~reaty

of Ryswick

in 1697 the western third of the island was formally ceded
to Prance.

Through the efforts of the French planters, the

colony of Saint-Domingue, as it was called, became one of
the most fertile and productive regions in the New World,
and the most precious overseas possession of France.
was centered a rich plantation

~conomy

Here

which provided sugar

and coffee for European tables but which lacked a supply of
salt meat, salt fish, and flour to feed the thousands of
lCharles Callan Tansill, The united States and Santo
Dominio, 1798-18731 A Chaeter In caribbean DIplomacy (Bal
tImorel 30hn Hopilns Jress, 1938), p. 1.
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Negro alaves who cultivated the valuable crops.

France

could not furnish the thriving colony with enough cheap
meat, but the British North American colonist. could.

Soon

Yankee traders were supplying the French planters with fish,
salt meat, live.tock, flour, rice and other provisions in
return for sugar and molas8es.

French attempts to impose

limitations on the trade repeatedly met with failure.

The

importance of this lucrative trade was stated by John Adams
in 1783 when he declared that wso essential is this commerce
to both parties that if the governments forbid it, it will
be carried on clandestinely.w2
In the first weeks of August 1791, aeveral Negro
leaders formulated plans for overthrowing the hated slave
owners of Haiti.
out the colony.

By September the revolt had spread through
The United States government at first

-extended assistance to the colonial administration in Haiti
through payments upon the national debt owed to France,w3
but the whites, outnumbered eleven to one, were slaughtered
in large numbers and were gradually forced from the island.
After a series of costly wars the Neqro leader Tous
saint l'Overture led the blacks to victory in Haiti and by
1801 secured control over the whole of Hispaniola.
cesa, however, was only temporary.

His suc

Napoleon, free from

2The Works of John Adams, ed. by C.F. Adams (10 vols"
Boston, 1854), vttI, p. 79, quoted in Tansill, 0e.cit., p.3.
3Tansill, 0e.cit., p.8.
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entanglement in Europe, immediately organized a military
expedition, under General Victor La Clerc, to recover Santo
Domingo.

Toussaint was forc·ed to surrender, and was later

captured and imprisoned in France where he died within a year.
The Prench, however, presently faced a new series of revolts
led by the capable Negrc commander, Jean Jacques Dessalines.
The Prench position soon became a defensive one.

By the end

of 1802 yellow fever had ravaged the Prench army and killed
its commander and wben the Peace of Amiens was broken by
warfare in 1803 Napoleon decided he could ill afford to dis
sipate his strength in quest of empire west of the Missis
sippi.

An

astute Thomas Jefferson, realizing that without

Hispaniola as a cornerstone the proposed French Empire in the
West was at beat a shaky structure, sent James Monroe to aid
the American Minister at Paris, Robert Livingston, in negoti
ating a sale of the Plorida. and New Orleans.
Napoleon, realizing failure in Hispaniola, and know
ing full well that England might land an army in Louisiana
and hold the territory by right of conquest, endeavored to
win the good will of the United States, and thereby keep
her from forming an alliance with England, by selling the
Louisiana Territory in its entirety to the United States
government for fifteen million dollars.
The Prench were able to maintain themselves in Santo
Domingo (the Spanish portion of the island) until 1809
when a national insurrection, aided by Spanish and English

8

troops succeeded in expelling them forever.

The people

of Santo Domingo then accepted the rule of Spain until 1821
when a Republic was proclaimed.

Independence, however,

lasted only the few weeks that it took the President of
Haiti, Jean Pierre Boyer, to occupy the country.
Haitian rule (1822-44) was a period of social and
economic retrogression for Dominicans.

Every effort was

made to Haitianize the oountry by extending the Haitian
laws, and imposing Haitian administrators and governors who
ruled with an iron hand.

Through the systematic use of

terror Spanish families were forced from the island and
their lands resettled by Haitians.

The University of santo

Domingo, one of the oldest in the western Hemisphere, was
closed.

With the expUlsion of all Spanish priests the clergy

deteriorated and many ohurohes were left without priests.
Misery was widespread and ·public spirit seems to have sunk
so low that only rarely were any sporadic efforts made to
raise the standard of a new rebellion.- 4

The following

report SUbmitted to the British Parliament in 1826 by the
British Consul-General in Haiti provides a graphic descrip
tion of the effeots of Haitian rules
The whole isle is divided into departments,
arrondissements, and communes. These are all
under the command of military men subject only
4S umner Welles, Naboth's Vinetards

Re~ublic5 1844-1924

(2 vols., New orks

Lt ., 19 8), I, pp. 51-2.

the Dominican
Payson , Clarke

9

to the control of the President, and to them is
entrusted exclusively. the execution of all laws
whether affecting police, agriculture or finance.
There is not a single civilian charged with an
extensive authority • • • During the past two
years trade has gradually fallen off and • • • it
is supposed that it has decreased nearly one half
• • • The moat important code is the Code Rural,
the cbief cbaracter of wbicb i8 the enforcing of
labor. It is a modification of the old Prench
regulations sanctioned by the Code Noire, with
additional restrictions. The provisions are as
despotic as those of any slave system that can be
conceived. The laborer may almost be considered
aa -adacriptus glebe,- he is deemed a vagrant and
liable to punishment if he ventures to move from
his dwelling or farm without license. He is pro
hibited from keeping a shop. No person can build
a houae in the country not connected with a farm.
• • • The Code affixes the penalty or fine in some
cases, and there is indeflnite imprisonment at the
option of the justice of the peace. CUltivation
would not go on beyond that which daily neeesai
ties might require, except for the Code. The
degrease in population in thirty-three years has
been very nearly one-third of the whole population
in 1793 • • • The Government has appropriated all
the church property to ita own use. The clergy
rely wholly on the feea, two-thirds of which they
are obliged to pay into the Treasury. • • • It is
not a subject of surprise that morality should be
in as low a stage • • • Marriage is scarcely thought
of • • • • 5
Under Boyer, however, trade with the United States
I

once _+ain quickened so that by 1822 -the value of American
export, [3:0 the island of Hispaniol!] was equivalent to the

oomb!ntd

expor~.

to Ruaeia, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark aDd

~From a report of Charles McKenzie, British Consul
General in Haiti, submitted September 8, 1826, by the Rt.
Hon. George Canning to Parliament, quoted in Welles, op.cit.,
I, pp. 52-3.
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Ireland.- 6

Although lucrative commercial relations bound

the United States to Hispaniola, the government in Washing
ton refused to establish a diplomatic post.

The

main reason

diplomatic recognition of Boyer's government was not forth
coming w.s because of the ticklish slavery question.

Rep

resentatives from the South ware particularly vehement in
their denunciation of proposed Haitian recognition.

Their

position was well outlined by Senator Benton of Missouri in
1826 when he stated that.
We purchaae coffee from her, and pay for it,
but we interchange no consuls or ministers. • • •
And why? Becaus. the peace of eleven states will
not permit the fruits of a successful negro insur
rection to be exhibited among them. • • • It will
not permit the fact to be seen, and told, that for
the murder of their masters and mistresses, they
are to find friends &mOng the white people of these
United States.'
It was not until 1844, the year in which the Dominican
Republic gained its independence from Haiti, that the United
states entered into official diplomatic relations with the
island of Hispaniola.

After abortive attempts at seeking

European assistance, Dominican President Pedro Santana,8
fearing an invasion attempt by General Charles H'rard of
'Niles' Register, XX, p. 49, quoted in Tansill, ~
cit., p. 12(1.

-

p.

'Belistar of Debates in CODjres., 19 Cong., 1 ses8.,
1n 'anslii, op.c1£., p. 122.

330, quoted

8Santana was president three times. His terms were as
follows. November 13, l844-August 4, 1848, February 15,
l853-May 26, 18561 January 31, l8S9-March 18, 1861.
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Haiti and wishing to establish a treaty of friendship and
~

commerce, sent Dr. Jose M. Caminero a& special envoy to the
United States to obtain recognition.

Within six weeks'

time Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, at the urging of
President John Tyler, sent a special agent, John Hogan, to
the Dominioan Republic to obtain information concerning

the resources and internal conditions of the island.

In

Hogan's opinion the island was of -inestimable value- and
had ·one of the most admirable positions which the world
can exhibit for a commeroial emporium.- 9

The administration of James Polk, however, desired
more information and in the spring of 1846 entrusted a fact
finding mission to a young naval lieutenant, David D. Por
ter.

Porter's observations were critical in many respects.

He recognized the presence of valuable mineral deposits and
delighted at the harbor potentialities of Sam&n4 Bay but of
the climate he remarked that -the air at night is filled
with poisonous flies, and mosquitoes drive one alreost mad,
while as to the constitution of the Republic he believed
that for the present, -it might as well never have been adop
ted, • • •

because of

flagrant abuses of power.· 10

9&ogan to Buchanan, October 4, 1845, S;icial Agents
Series, XIII, MS. Dept. of State, quoted ininsIII, op.cit.,
p.

121),.

lODavid D. Porter, Journal of a Mission to Santo
Domingo, 1846, quoted in TansIII, op.elf., p. 128.
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With the outbreak of the Mexican War in May, 1846, the
United States paid soant attention until 1849 to the affairs
of the Dominioan Rapublio,with the result that the Domini
oans, feeling slighted, turned to Europe for succor.

By

1849, however, the Dominicans, faoed with the threat of be
ing conquered by President !'austin Soulouque of Haiti, once
again pleaded with the United States government for a promise
of protection or annexation.

During this time an American

observer described Santo Domingo as a oity wherel
Consternation and alarm prevail. The President
of Haiti, Soulouque, is within two days- march of
this city with 10,000 blacks. He declares exter
mination to all whites and mulattoes and has beaten
the people of this Republic in every battle. My
house is already filled with frightened females •
• • • The Haitian army is almost upon us. Almost
all of the foremost merchants have packed up their
godd. and shipped them to the neighboring islands
before leaving with their families. The town is
filled with women and children from the country
and famine ia to be apprehended. • • • The Pres
ident has told me that it is his intention to set
fire to the place in Itse they cannot hold out
against the Haitians.
The American minister, Benjamin Green, while sympathetic to
Dominican overtures, was forced

to

remain noncommittal,

whereupon, -the Dominican government, on February 22, 1850,
addressed identical notes to the representatives of the
United Statea, Prance, and England, requesting joint inter
llElliott to Buchanan, April 13, 1849, and April 24,
1849, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, pp. 89-90.

13
vention and mediation. e12
When Millard Fillmore beoame President as a result of
President Zachary Taylor's sudden death in July 1850, he
immediately appointed Daniel Webster to replaoe John M.
Clayton as Secretary of State.

Seoretary Webster's sympa

thies were strongly enlisted on the side of the Dominioans
and he deci4ed early that ethe only effective method for
maintaining the stability of the Dominican Government lay
in joining Prance and England in a joint mediation.- 13 Web
ster's nomination resulted in Robert M. Walsh's elevation
as special agent to Santo Domingo and Haiti replacing Ben
jamin Gnen.

Mr.

Walsh set sail for Hispaniola on January

25, 1851 and upon arriving proceeded immediately to Port au
Prince where he presented his credentials to the British and
Prench oonsuls.

In Webster's decision to join France and

Britain in mediation to bring peace to the tiny republic he
had instructed Walsh to resist any aotions whioh might
-trench upon the just rights of the Dominicans.- 14 While
willing to jointly mediate the Dominican crisis, Washington
atill-Iooked with disfavor upon European intervention in the
12Tansill, op.cit., p. 136.
13welle8, op.cit., I, p. 112.
14Webster to Walsh, January 18, 1851, quoted in Welles,
op.oit.:, I, p. 113.
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Western Hemisphere.· 1S
After presenting his credentials Mr. Walsh informed
the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the govern
ment of the United States had decided to cooperate with the
governments of England and Prance to secure Dominican sov
ereignty and that.
Any further-prosecution of the war, therefore,
ia abhorrent to the dictates of humanity and reason
and injurious to the interests of neutrals. • • •
Tbe principle ia now fully established that the
actual possession of independence for a reasonable
time entitles a nation to be acknowledged as sov
ereign. This is a principle which the American
world established as consecrated and muat ever be
upheld • • • The best intereats of the Haitian
Empire demand the recognition of Dominican indepen
dence • • • In every point of view, therefore, the
Government of the United States entertains the
conviction that it is incumbent upon the Emperor
[iaustinli' to recognize the independence of Santo
Domingo.
Previous to Mr. Walsh's arrival in Port au Prince, the
French and British consuls, in conjunction with the Commer
cial Agent of the United states, had urged Soulouque, who
had recently proclaimed himself Emperor 'austin I, to accept
a definitive peace.

When this proposal was turned down the

mediating powers suggested a ten year truce.

Walsh pushed

15Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United states
(4th ad., rev., New fork.
Appleton-century company,
1943), p. 278.

o.

16 Wa1s h to the Duke de Tiburon, Haitian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, February 7, 1851, quoted in Welles, op.cit.,
I, pp. 116-17.
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the latter idea strongly but the responses of the Haitian
government remained negative.

After four months of fruit

less talks -the representatives of the three powers departed
empty-handed except for the promise that hostilities would
not be renewed without notification to their governments.- 17
Dominican President Buenaventura B~ez,18 miffed at the
governments of the United states, France, and Britain for
their failure to guarantee protection from Haitian onslaught,
in 1858 appealed to Spain to establish a protectorate' over
her former colony.

Spain, however, was not anxious to annex

a hornet's nest as -it feared that assumption of an active
role might awaken the jealousy of the United States, and
alienate the sympathies of the Cuban slaveholders.- 19

Once

again the Dominicans, under a new president, Pedro Santana,
looked to the United States for protection.

On

November 2,

1853 President Franklin Pierce's Secretary of State, William
L. Marcy, instructed General

wi11i~.

as special agent to Santo Domingo.

L. Cazneau to proceed

General Cazneau, an avowed

expansionist, pressed for closer relations between the United
States and the Dominican Republic.

On

the strength of

l7chester Lloyd Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900
York. Prentice-Ball, Inc., 1936), p. 79.

(New

l8 B'ez was president five times. Bis terms were as
follow.. September 24, 1849-February 15, 1853, October 8,
l856-Ju1y 7, 1857, December 8, 1865-May 28, 1866, May 2,
1868-December 31, 1873, December 27, 1876-March 2, 1878.
19Jones, op.cit., p. 80.
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Cazneau's assurances that ·President Santana's ruling policy
is indubitably the creation of the Dominican Republic as an
independent American power, preferably under the protection
of the United states,·20 coupled with his glowing descrip
tion of the Republic's natural wealth, the Pierce administra
tion released instructions on July 17, 1854 to Casneau to
negotiate a treaty of friendship, commerce, and naVigation,
with the stipulation that Article 28 of the proposed treaty
was to grant the United States a naval and coaling station
at Saman' Bay.21
Word of the negotiations leaked out, however, and
France and Great Britain protested this attempt to secure
special privileges of a military character in the Caribbean.
When British and French warships, summoned by the two Euro
pean representatives, Sir Robert Schomburgk and Maxime
Raybaud, positioned themselves in Dominican waters Santana
and Cazneau became convinced that force might be used to
prevent ceding of Samana.

Cazneau attempted to withdraw the

treaty but ·Schomburgk and Raybaud, in order to ensure defeat
of the treaty in the United States Senate prevailed on the
Dominican government to insert a clause to the effect that
coloured Dominicans travelling in the United States would be
20Casneau to Marcy, January 23, 1854, quoted in Welles,
22.cit., I, p. 144.
21Rayford W. Log-an, Baiti and the Dominican RerubliC
(New lork and Longon: Oxfora unIversity Press, 1968 , p. 37.
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accorded the same treatment as white Americans.- 22

Secre

tary of State Marcy realized such a proposal would meet with
early defeat at the hands of Southern Senators and so did not
submit the treaty for ratification.
In 1856 President Santana attempted once again to
negotiate a treaty with the United States.

The treaty con

tained only the standard stipulations of friendship and
commerce but -rumors that the treaty included a secret con
vention leasing Sam&nA Bay to the United States stirred
renewed aotivities by Schomburgk and Raybaud • • • [in~
Santana, realizing that he could no longer look to the United
States for support, resigned on May 26, 1856.- 23

After a

succession of chief executives Santana returned from exile
to become President for the third time on January 31, 1859.
Santana was still convinced that the survival of the Domin
iean Republic rested with its being annexed by a foreign
power and so pressed for negotiations with his last remaining
hope, Spain.

By March of 1860 arrangements with Spain were

nearly complete.

Propagandists created sympathy among the

people for the idea of Spanish annexation by claiming that
Spain had regenerated herself into a modern nation.

With

ever-increasing enthusiasm it was explained that Spain pos
sessed railways and steamships, encouraged popular education,

...........

22Ibid., p. 38 •
23 Ibid., p. 39 •

...........
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and had repealed oppressive laws relating to industry and
commerce. 24
Spain watched the government of the United states
drift toward Civil War and decided that the time was oppor

tune to recapture the glory of a lost colonial possession.
On March 18, 1861 the negotiations were made public and
Santana addressed a letter to Isabella II, assuring her thata
The Dominican people, giving a free course to
those sentiments of affection and loyalty which
have been so long repressed,'have unanimously and
spontaneously proclaimed you as their Queen and
Sovereign, and I, who have now the exalted and
undeserved honor of being the organ of those sin
cere sentiments, lay at you~5Majesty's feet the
keys of this lovely island.
The Dominicans, however, were not long content under
a Spanish hand that daily grew more repressive.

Educated

Dominioans chafted under a Spanish administration that
replaced looal inhabitants in high positions with Spaniards.
The long awaited economic rejuvenation also was not forth
coming, as tariffs were manipulated to favor Spanish export
ers rather than local industry.

By 1863 the Spanish army,

already thinned by yellow fever, was faced with armed rebel
lion.

Bxcesaes committed by both sides only fanned the flames

of hatred and wrought devastation throughout the land.

By

1865 Spain judged the situation as hopeless and plans were
24'l'anSill, op.cit., p. 219.
25British parliamentary pa~rs, 1861, LXV. Papers
relating to Xiinexa£lon of !antoDllngo, p. 28, quoted in
Stuart, op.ait., p. 278.

l'
.uba1t~d to

the Spanish Corta. for evacuation.

On May 1,

1865, Isabella waa foroed to .i9A a law revoking the annexa
tion.

Onoe lIIOre the Doainicua wera independent.
After the ttJUmcipation of slaves in the ualtecl States

and the defe.t. of the Confederacy the tiCklish pxoblea of
recognition of Haiti and the Dominican Republic was at onae
resolved.

Also the fact that Spain had enterad the cartbbeaa

and annexed the DoIIiaicaD Republic -.rous.4 • vraater detera
in.tion by the Uftited Itat.. that the i.lud should n.ver
avain be doainated by a foreign power.- a6
ship and

~rc.

~h.

of friend

wa. concluded with Haiti in 1164 and dip

la.atic recognition 800n followed.

occupancy and

A tr.aty

Bacau.e of the Spanish

chaotio oonditions which followed the Domin

ican Republic was not recogni.ed until

septe~r

17, 1866.

In 1866 the questicm of SaIIIaft. once -.ore arose.
D.OW

a...

,

B••• ,

in his third term .s president, I8&4e overtur.. to s'or_

tary of State Sewar4, who v •• by nov a staunch expansionist.
sought. lIDDey and a_1 t.iona to keep bJ.uelf in power, but

negotiations vere barely UDder way when a succe.sful revolt
fO¥Ce4 h.1a into exile.

His SUC08.S0r, Jos' Mar!. Cabral,

howewr, .u equally enthuse.a with the prospect of leasing
certaia keya and coal I11n.. in S_an_ Bay in ret1U1l for -a

1d111oD dollars in the charaoter of _ lou

Oil

jut, equitable

20

an4 r •••OIlable

GOACU. tiona

bea., artill.~.-21

• • • ~ a nUlbar of pieces of

Cabral al.o aecretly indicatad a will

ingne•• to •• 11 Saaana Bay if it would be more profitable to
do 80.

Thls aU9veatloll (llke so ......y other. in Dominican

hi.tory) wa. ODe

-.ad.

by • h.r4-p~•••e4 government

hoped through the a14 requested to consolidate its

which

po.ltlon.~

Opposltion in the Dominican cabinet, how.ver, b•••d on the
conatitutiona1 aaendaent that forb.de tranafer of territory

through ••le to a foreign power, forced Cabral to renege on
his previoua offer••
Although Preaident Cabral aou9ht to renew . ..,otiationa
a

~volution

18"

whicb erupted In Monte Cristi on October "

forced bia adminiatration froa power

Oft January 31,

1868 and placed the e...r-durable .... in the President' a

cbair for the fourth time.

s'-s' retun to power did not.
I

brinC) to a halt the plus revard1nq SalUlDa for b. ·wa. too

.agacious a stat••BaD t.o fail to recogni.. the value of Ameri
can protection.- 29

a'••

va. barely inaugurated when a .erie. of revolts

broke out along the Haitian frontier.

In order to . .intaln

his admiDiatratlon be showed hi. .elf not only wl1ling to sup
port a l.a•• conventioD, but went ao far a. to pre.. for out
27Garata to Seward, MoV8lllber 8, 1866, quoted in Wall•• ,
I, p. 323.
28Jone., ge.clt., p. 8t.

op.o1~.,

-

ure

2tOt:to Soboenrich, Santo DoIUnloi
()lew York. Th. . .eMIlIo COiiiany I

A CGWl!!X With a Fa:.

1,1'), p. I'.
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ri9hc annexation, a polioy that had led to hi. predecessor'.
8xilel

As

desperate.

hi. position

gRW

more In.ecure •••• beo_

S.eking to . .lntain b:1...11 in power he .ugge.eed

that the United State. govern_nt,

• • • publisb • declal'aUon placing the Domin
leu Republio uder the proteatiOD of 'the Unit..d
State., and su.tain the proclamation by aeading
v••••l. of war to take po•••••ion of a_at 84
Man.anilla bay., aDd in fact, any othec point.
that. a military nece•• ity ••1" requlre. 10

Such • pxopoe.l .urp••••d e98n the flex:1ble ...aure. that
Seoretary of St.te Seward bad been contellpl.t.in9 and he was

force4 in Movember of 1868 to convey to Sa.. the followlng
.tat_aent.
'file COIlgn•• of the united State. is alway.
di.inclined to fORip military conque.ts, per
hap. mora so DOW than at. any t1ae beretofore. It
..... unlikely, then-fon, that COIlgres. would
entertain any other propo.ition for the .....at1on
of Dominica than ODe which should originate with
and ha". the aanctlon of the Dominican peop18
expr••••d in a r.gular Coaatitutional .ann.r.~Al

OIl the Dominican question Seward had the full .ympathy
of President Andrew Johnson who stated in hi. fourth annual
_.8ag8 to Convr••• in 1868 that.

I am ••ti.fiad that the time haa arrived when
even so direct a proceeding a• • proposition for
an annexation of the two Republic. of the i.land
30Sa1tb to Sew.rd, October 24, 1868, Santo DoIlingo,
vol. V'. MS. Dept.. of Stat., quotea Iii
'aa.Il1, op.C1t., p. 267.

Con.ular

Dese..

31sevU'd to aaitll, November 17, 1168, quoted in

Nelle., 02- cit., 1. p. 352.
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of Santo Domingo would not only receive the consent
of the people interested but would al!~ give satis
faotion to all other foreign nations.
Unhappily for Seward, President Johnson's relations with
Congress were so strained that his influence was minimal.
Annexationist ambitions in the Caribbean, therefore, lay in
abeyance until the advent of the new Grant administration.
Under the Grant administration ideas of expansionism
flourished as the ex-general of the

U~ion

Armies thought

that -the imperative need of America was colonial expans
ion.- 33

Grant took note of the plight of the Megro in the

United States and looked to the Dominican Republic as a place
where the black man could secure the blessings of -meaningful
liberty.

In his memoirs he states that -I took it that the

colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have
independent states governed by their own race.- 34

With this

idea in mind be instructed his Secretary of State, Hamilton
Fish, to

d~s~a~ch

General Orville E. Babcock to Santo Domingo

to obtain information reqarding the conditions of the island
32James D. Richardson, A COmpilation of the Messages
and pa~rs of the Presidents 01 the Unlte3 States (20 vols"
New YO~I Bureau of RatIonal Literature, Inc, 1917), XIII,
p. 3889.

33Tansill, op.cit., p. 338.
34U1Y5888 S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S.
(2 vols" New Yorkl eliarles L. Webster 5C:ompany,
1885J, II, p. 550.
Grant
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and the disposition of government and people towards the
United statee. 3S
When Babcock arrived in Santo Dominqo in the early
summer of 1869 he was immediately collared by William L.
Cazneau and his partner in mischief, Colonel Joseph W. Fabens.
TheBe two schemers kept the General constantly in their com
pany allowing him to see and hear only the pleasantness of
the Republio.

Especially did they keep him away trom the

resident American oommercial agent, J. Somers Smith, who knew
the true condition ot the island and who trequently -expressed
in his communiques to the Secretary of State a sharp suspic
ion of General Cazneau and Colonel Fabens.- 36
Under the direction of Cazneau, Babcock became intimate
with B'ez and was soon a staunch supporter of the idea of
annexation.

Upon his return to the United States he urged

President Grant to use his influence amonq members ot
to popularize the idea of annexation.

Cong~

Grant, easily influ

enced by his friends, acceded to Babcook's desires.

Babcock

was then sent back to conclude the negotiations, which were
to be signed by Raymond U. Perry, the recent replacement of
Commercial agent J. Somers Smith, whose only fault had been
his unwavering honesty.
Upon his return to Santo Domingo Babcock was once again
35stuart,oe.cit., p. 281.
36T&naill, 0e.cit., p. 372.
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closely supervised by Cazneau and Fabens to insure success
I

in negotiations with Baez.

His instructions, given to him by

Secretary of State Fish, directed him, in the event a treaty
was concluded, as an officer of the Army of the United Statesl
• • • to carry out the agreement of the United
States contained in said treaty to protect the peo
ple of that Republic against foreign interference
while the nation is expressing its will and a180
to protect the interest and rights which the United
States may obtain under such convention. 37
In order to help Babcock in this task he was given a draft
for $100,000 and the backing of the United States Navy if it
became necessary to protect the Dominican Republic until the
will of its people could be ascertained.
On November 29, 1869 negotiations were concluded
between the two governments and two treaties were signed,
one providing for annexation of the Dominican Republic as a
territory of the United States, and the other (in case out
right annexation was opposed in the Senate) providing for

,

the right to lease Samana Peninsula and its fine harbor with
in fifty year. upon payment of $2,000,000. 38 As soon as the
documents were signed General Babcock turned over $150,000
I

in money and munitions to Baez and, accompanied by Generals

,

Delos B. Sackett and Rufus Ingalls, sailed for Samana Bay to
hoist the American flag and take formal possession of the
37Fish to Babcock, September 6, 1869, quoted in Welles,
op.cit., I, p. 376.
38Stuart, op.cit., p. 281.
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newly acquired territory.
I

Baez, feeling his hold on power growing tenuous, appealed
to Washington for help, this time with results.

By the end of

February 1870, seven American warships were stationed in Dom
inican waters, with orders from the Secretary of the Navy,
instruoting the squadron to direct their operations in accord
ance with the indications of President B.az.

The influence

I
of Baez,
who feared interference from Haiti and Dominican

revolutionaries based in Haiti, is mirrored in the mesaage
sent to President Nissage Saget of Baiti by the Commander of
the United States Naval detachment.

Saget was warned that

Wany interference: or attack by vessels under the Haitian or
any other flag upon the Dominicans during the pendency of
negotiations will be considered an act of hostility to the
flag of the United states and will provoke hostility in
return.- 39
Baez, now safely under the protection of American quns,
decided the time wa. ripe for a plebiscite designed

to

demon

strate the desire of Dominicans to be united with the United
States.

Proclaiming the voting booths open in all the prov

inces, BaaZ stated on pebruary 19, 1870, that Wit is hig-h i •
time that the Government should take legal steps to assure
itself that the desired purpose is in truth the real expres
39poor to Nissage Sagat, President of Haiti, February
10, 1870, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 384.
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sion of the national wlll. w40

Playing in large part on the

old fears of Haitian attack the Government-directed news
paper, the Boletin Oficial, assured the people that ·Santo
Domingo gains everything and loses nothing • • • Annexation
means salvation because it will oblige Haiti to respect
Dominican rights and to maintain a decent conduct and because
it will persuade all Dominicans to renounce political dis
putes.- 4l
Needless to say, there was no -real expression- of
national will.
all.

That the voting was not free was evident to

Through his police Baez intimidated opponents of annex

ation with threats of imprisonment and exile.

Major Raymond

B. Perry, the Amerioan Commercial Agent, stated in a oom
munitue to Secretary of State Fish thata
i. Baez has told me several times that if any man
fpposed annexation he would either shoot him or
,end him his passports. He also told me that it
should be a free vote of the people but such was
not the case. • • • I have seen Baez • • • shake
his fist in the face of some of his nearest friends
• • • and tell them he would banish them from the
island if they opposed annexation • • • • 42he pris
ons are filled with politioal prisoners.

When the ballots were finally counted it was found that
out of 16,000 votes cast only eleven were found to express
40presldential decree of Baez issued on February 19,
1870, quoted in Wellea, op.cit., I, p. 384.
4lBoletin Ofioial, Santo DOmingo, February 19, 1870,
quoted in wellea, op.cIt., I, p. 385.
~.,

42 perry to Fish, June 7, 1870, quoted in welles, ~
I, p. 386.
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opposition to annexation.

The ever scholarly Sumner Welles

mentions that these eleven dissenting votes ·were recognized
as having been cast at the President's instance by his agents
in order to prevent the proceedings from appearing too
farcical:- 43 The results were immediately reported to Wash
ington by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who wrote that
·the desire is great with Which this country almost unani
mously is burning to see the conclusion of its annexation
to the United States.- 44
The soene of activity now moves to Washington where
the incoming information became a focal point of general
discuasion.

The debate that followed in the Senate brought

about a serious controversy between President Grant and
Senator Charles Sumner, a longtime friend of the President.
The President stood for annexation for reasons already
stated.

Sumner, however, felt the proposed treaty was a

travesty of justice, and further felt it would allow the
United States to adopt an aggressive policy toward Haiti
which his abolitionist principles would not allow. 45

out

side the Senate the people of America gave little support
to

the project and only a few newspapers came to the defense
43Welles, op.cit., I, p. 386.

44Gautier to Fish, March 18, 1870, quoted. in welles,
oe.cit., I, p. 387.
45Jones, op.cit., p. 94.
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of the propo.ed annexation. 46

The Sen.te debat•• were bit

ter, but Sumner, .a chairman of the Sen.te Ca..itta. on
Por.ip Affair., wielded too much power and influence to be
ov.r~.

Bi.

ar~at.

wera also pereua.i"., chief among

Which are the following.
A. Tb. propo.ed annexation would probably
encoura,. further Aaerican acquisitions of C.rib
bean terri tory and would thus involve the Vnited
St.tes in ••rious comp1icationa with other powers.
B. 'fIlere i. 1itUe likelihood of further inter
vention by Buropean power. in the .ffair. of the
Dominican Republic.

c. 'the United State., in the event of aDD.xa
tion would probably be .addled with a public debt
much larVer than had been anticipated.
CeDtinued civil war and rebellions would be
an .ftermath of annexation.
D.

B. Annexation would impair the pre4oll1nance of
the colored r.ce in th1,.est Indies and therefore
would be un~ust to it.

Wh.n the vote on Dominican

aDD• •ation

v.. fin.lly taken

on JW1e 30, 1810, the treaty f.iled by a vote of twenty-ei9ht
to

twenty-eight, two-tbirda b.ing nec••••ry for ratification.

Sumner had ...rged victorious.

'resident Grant, bowever,

.till .ought to keep the project alive and in hi. aecond an
nual .....,. to COD9ress on Dec.mber S, 1810, he recommended
that.
By joint ..e.olution of the two 80"••• of Congre••
the Bx.cati.. he authorized to appoint a co..t••ion
46~ansili, op.cit., p. 407.

47••w fork Herald, March 26, 1870, quoted in Tansill,
op.cit., p. 40~.
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to ae90tiate a treaty with the authorities of
San Domingo for the anaeaatioD of that island and

that an appropriatioD.__ made to defray the expen.e.
of such a ooa.is.ioo.
Ai tllou9h Senate opposl tien to aueuticll remained

strODg, ullplrs oooled enough to allow a proposal to be
aClopted whiob would peJ!'lli t three comai••ioll8J:s to 1Dquire
Ofto. more into the political and eCOIlomc cond! tion of the

island.

SUllDer, who balieveel our policy should be one of

-k!a4aes., be. . .olence, ... istance, aid, belp, protectJ.on,

and all that is implied in 900d neighborhood,-.' waa alti
.ately ouatea fro. his committe. Chairmanship for his dis
s.nting "Ii."s.
ID li.. with the cODgressional proposal, Pre.ident

Great entrusted the fact. finding ai••ion to til"... distin

guished

G. How..

meftl

Benjuain 1'• •ade, Andrew D. White, and Saauel

After an elaborau and painstaking StU:"V'8y the

flnal .iew of the tbree investi,atora .as that aDDexation
would be _st profitable to the UDitad States.

fte Grant

adalnlstration, howe....r, scolded dally by opposition editor
ials and faced with numerous char.,.s of corruption, va. forced
to reject further proposals al. .4 at annexation of the Domini
cu Republic. 50
48Richar4aon, op.cit., IX, pp •• 054-85 •
• 9Quoted 1D Well.s, !p.alt.~-:I, p. '98.

50Logan, op.clt., p••6.
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After the ill-iavend effort. of Grut. and Fi.h, the
United Stat.s lost interest in further territorial expan.mn
in the caribbean region.

When, in 1881, President. 8.101lOn

of Haiti offered to cade the island of La Fortue to the
united st.atea, he va. politely refu.ed.

At the time, Secre

tary of State I'rederick T. Prelinpuy.en said that -the
policy of thi. govemaent • • • ha. teaded towards a.oi4u08
of po..... ioDa 4isCODDected from the .ain ooatinent.- Sl Ia
1884 the overture vaa extended ODce .cre, this time for

either the bay of La M8l. or the islud of 'tort.uga, aa4 once
agaia the otfar vas refused.
made to

aDDeX

ODe last futile attempt was

Saman' Bay in 1892, but negotiations were still

iD the iafant.ila stage vhea President Benjamin Harrison

decided

DOt

to

flO

ahead with the plaa. 52

United St.ates· luistuce that the Doainican Republic
RU.t. oe.,.r be cioainat.e4 by a forei9n power had led to a
policy of &DD8xatioo by Wa.hington lea4ers who favored
Daited states expaasioa in the Caribbean.

After the ill

faftreu -.fforta of the Grant adaiDiat..at.lon, the unit.ed Sta_
lost interest in any further annexation attempts for a vari
ety of rea8Ons.

Chief among the. v•• a refusal by a majority

of Coagre••ioDal le.der. to embrace the cau.. of expansion
in the Caribbeu.

Popular aupport., whila never treat, diain

51Stuart, op.oit., p. 283.
52Jon•• , ge.oit., p.

'9.
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i.hed even more with the announcement of the unsavory finan
cial operations connected with the project.

Indee~in

1892,

when Dominican overtures regarding the 1eaaing of Saman.
Bay were leaked to the pre•• , popular agitation in the
united States waa ao great that President Uli8e8 Heureaux
was forced to publish an official 8tatement in the Gaceta
Oficial denying that any 8uch overture was made.

Be com

plained thatl
The great difficulty i8 your American press.
Whenever a Dominican editor writes anything objec
tionable or put. my pictu~e in his paper a8 a cari
cature I put him in prison. That settles it. In
the United Stat.s, the writers abuse their privi
lege. and your:.:ruling men do nothinv. That article
in the Gaceta Oficial i denial that negotiations
were in pr09resl wIll quiet the people. Then Mr.
Blaine can ••nd iDAtructiona. We can go to work
so.. IDOntbs in the future s.cretly. If we succeed
it will be done before anybody can make any noise.
If we obl!in no good result, th.re will be no bad
feeling.
Although the United State. had lost interest in fur
ther attempts at annexation, this -did not indicate by any
means any l ••••ning of united States interest in the aepub
lics of Hispaniola,_54 for Waahington waa still insistent
that the Dominican Republic must never be dominated by a
foreign power.

53Durham to General John W.~Po8ter, July 22, 1891,
quoted in welles, op.cit., I, pp. 479-80.
54Mecham, op.cit., p. 281.

CHAP'tlIR II
'IHE CUSTOMS RBCBIVBRSHIP

The DoBdnican Republic had weathered the turbulence

and disorder brought about by aaitian and Spanish intrusion,
and by Unitea
By

Sute.'

projects wbieb .i. .o . t annexation.

1'00, bowever, a .eri•• of foreign debts, totaling nearly

forty million dol1ara, into which unscrupulous le.ders like

,

Baanaventura Ba.. and Uli.e. Ueuraaux had 1.d the tiny nation,
had placed tbe oa.lnican aepublic in a po.ition of debt

peonaqe.

Citizens of the united States and of .even Euro

pean nationa became en9&vad in a confu••d scramble for the
contents of tne Dominican trea.ury.

The Doainican Republic

va. thus menaced with the possibility of foreign intervention
which might l ••d to indefinite occupation.
By 1904 Buropean creditor. vere actively urqinq their
governments to intervene to .ecure payment on their noDds.
Washington, however, was atill insistent that no intervention
by a European power in the Western aemisphere wa. to be

allowed, e.pecially

.0

clo.. to American shores.

In order

to forestall eay act.ion which might lead to European inter
ve.tion, Presideat Theodore Roo.evelt promulgated hi. corol
lary to the Monroe Doctrine in Which h. • •••rt.d the rivht

of the United Stat.. to

ac~

a. an international policeman
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in tho.e countries where chronic wrongdoing or impotence
prevented thea from ...ting their international obliga
The following year .aw the in.tallment of the Pre.i

~ioD..

dent'. policy on the .ummons of Dominican Pre.ident Carlos
r. Moral•• , who at the time w.s .orely menaced by domestic
and foreign

Roo....lt establi.h.d a cu.toma

an~a9oni.t..

receiv.rship de.iIDed to control and direct Dominican reve
nue. whieb be belleved would br1nq peace to the i.land and
.ati.fy clamoring foreign or.ditor..
1009 awaited stability

Unfortunately, the

v.. not forthcoming

and

the plan that

v •• admirable in its qualiti•• bec... but the first of a

••ri•• of .tapa that led to outright ailitary intervention
1D 1916.
~.

year 1869 witn••• ed the ,en•• l . of the Dominican
~

debt when Baen.ventura Baa., confronted vith depreciated
currency and threatening revolutionarie., negoUat.d an
advance of t757,700 from a group of Engli.h banker. headed
by

Hartmont 'Co.

The loan v•• typical of the exorbitant

di.count rat•• wbich poor and un.table countries had to
pay.

Sumner wellea co_nt. that -the terma were of so
on.rous a character a. to be almost incredible.- S5
As

finally agr.ed upon, the loan wa. reduced

to ~20,OOO

by the Dominican senate of which tlOO,OOO w•••armarked .a
a oomai•• ion for Hartmont 'CO.

Por the

5"ell•• , op.oit., I, p. 35t.

~inin9

t320,OOO
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the Doa1aicaD government plad,ed it.••lf to pay 158,'00
annually for twenty-four year., a

.UII

four t.1. . . the face value of the. loan.

..,ut.1nV to

tlaan

IIOre

All .ecurit.y, the

DouaLo_ go.e.r:ruaent. pledpd the ent.ire re.ources of the
bpub11e--spaeifically, t.he customs re'ND'Ge aDd the revenu.s
frOll cg\1aJlO,

coal, aaho9uy ud other forest. product...

Bart

aont I CO. sold boRd. UIOWlt1l19 to 1,757,700 to the public
at. rate. ruvin9 fZ'OJD 50 to 70 par cent, but by re••on of

neglect, fraud, or deliberate defalcat.ion, only 138,095
wa. recei. .d and accounted for by the DoIIinican 9oveZ1m8nt. 56

Baa.
'" and the Dominican Senata, realising they were baing
. .reile••1y fleeced, canceled the contract in 1870.

Interellt

on outllt.aDding bond. . . ,paid until Augut. 1872, wban t.he loaD
went into clefaalt..

The borrowed .olleY wu intended t.o pro

aot. roada and railways, but in.tead wa.

ct to ol.''U.b Bae.'

\1• •

OPPOUAt. and l1l1e the pocket. of his .upporters..

Further

default. under followin, admini.trations . .t. increasing objec
tion from the British 90varnMllt., which ij4 retro.-pect. aU9

vr.4 poorly for the futvre.
Bet.en 1872 and 1888 tbe .tory of the DoIIhd.can debt
is on. of steady acauaulatiOll of. floatinq indebtednes••
Salari•• of civil servant.s wara left unpaid, cla1aa lor

injurie• •uflend in the _ y "-mlutions ware fre.ly exteadld,
5'Jacob B. Bol1ander, -'fhe aaadju.taent of SaD Doaingo'a
Pinance.,· Q!!rterly Journal of BOODa.ie., XII, (May, 1907),

p. 405.
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treasury bill. .ere printed for the purchas. of war aater
lal, and tunds for current expanditure .ere borrowed from
lIIDD8y leaders ~ p:eec1 knew JX'! boUDd..

fi ••co had, for the tlae bein"

'lbe BartsDont

discouraged further bond is

.ue., whicb placed the Dominican 90vernaent at the . .roy of

the Mrahut lender. of' the Republic Wo.. intere.t. rate.

were

DOt.

inireqUutly as h19h a. 10 per cent a moath,

pounded IIODthly.

COIl

8y 1888 the total bonded d.ebt. of the Repub

lic had ri.en to $3,850,000. 57

'lbe l •• t fifth of the aueteaoth eent.ury wa. the period.
of another diotator, Vli••• aaure.we, who bee... PX'e.i4ent
00

Septe.ber 1, 1882.

Apparently of ille,ittm.te birth,

aear••ua obtained the pr.ctic.l .ducation of a .0141eX' in
the field.

....rl••• , oruel, Ma.ual, and a l ••der of

~,

he dominated Doainlcan affair. until an ......In·. bullet
eDde4 bi. tyraaay 1n 1899.

en•• ter

Lloyd

JODe• • t.t••

Of hi. a4a1ni.tJ:ation, Profe••or

that,

lleuzoeaux' rul. wa. to be one in which the
"public .lid eteadily from a bad to • wor.e poai
tiOB ana 014e in which there developed abu••• whiob
...48 the Do1Unican Republio ln the early year. of
the twent.ietil cent.uzy the center of f.a:-n ....cbinv
int.emat.ional ooalie.tion. thn.tening the contin

ued .xi.teDee of the nation. 51

Juat as Pre.ident. S.{e. had dOM in 18'9, aod14 Pre8i

dent Beveaux 1». 1888, eabarl'u.e4 by

58Jon•• , OR.cit., p. f5.

aD

empty utlaaury and
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h.raa•• d by do.atic and foraip creditor.,

tUrD

to the

foraiva mon.y aarketa ••• solution for the "public's
fLruUlci.l ill..
,. Co., of

A contraot w.. entered into with . .stendoz'p

~ta:rd. .

which provided for tbe i.aue of

thirty-y.ar 6 per cant go14 boDda.

TO plaoate Briti.b bau

9ov.rnaent.~th.;:'.\111

er. and tn. .oritl.h

~70,om

uaed to liquidate the BartD:Jnt loan.

of tA2, 860 wa. to be

Since

~

Dol'd.niou

govern.ent had rec.ived only about $150,000 fro. Hartmont,

it found ita.lf p.ying b.ck
pound

~l

for $1 wheD at the time the

w•• worth $4.80. 59 The . . .11

SUll

of t50,OOO\>:'Was .ar

aark.d to payoff the interior floating debt whil.

w••ten

dozp ,. Co. bought the rea.inder of the bonda at 78 per cent

of their face value.
91....11

•

freah l1en

For security, W••tendorp , Co. was

revenue., which weI.'. to be

OD CWltom.a

collected thJ:'Ough • board of .gents, the r~i., who were to
collect the aJIOlIDt n.c••••z:y to s.rvice the loan chUge.
and pay for collection .xpenses.

~he

resaininv revenue

Wd

to be turned over to the Doad.Rican 90veX1lMnt.
In 18'0

a ..cond lOaD in the . _ of it'GO,OOO, redeem

able in fifty-six year. at the rate of 6 per cent, wa•
••gotiat.d. with . . . tendorp ,.

CO.,

to ••cure funda for the

construction of a railroad froa Puerto Plata to Santiqo.

Unhappily for DoIail'lican., Seureawe u••4 aoat of the aoney
to rid billa.lf of freab accuaalatioD8 of floatiDe; iDdebtad

"Logan, !R*c1t., p. 50.
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ne•• and equandered the rest on per.onal extravagance••
In the lIlfIan'tJ.ae, W.atendorp , Co. encounterea 90vemment
interference in the collection of customs dutie..

When

Heareaux de.ired fund. he would seize certain revenues and
pledge them to local merchants to obtain whatever he needed'O

,

As a re.ult, the regie was unable t.o .ervice the bonds.
When Seureaux defaulted on the two We.tendorp loans
in 1892 the Amaterdaa banking firm applied to two New York
attorneys to negotiate a sale of the bonda to the United
States government.

Washington flatly refused the offer, but

Secretary of Stat. roater suggested that an American fira
take over the duti.. of We.tendorp
of intereats

to

to

foreatall any transfer

Prench or German bankers.'l

Immediately the

co1Ml1•• ionea attorney., Smith M. Weed and Charles

w.

Welle.,

orqanized the San Domingo Improve_nt Company of New York
and acquired the rights and obligations of We.ten4orp , Co.
Sy 1893 the San Dolllingo Improvement Co. had become the DoaiaJr.

can aepublic·. banker.
Fresh DODey va. es.ential if Heur.aux waa to maintain
hi. despotic control.

The tyrant s.cured it in the form of

two loans from the San Domingo Improvement Co.
to extend a

~otal

~hicb

agree:S

ot $3,285,000 to refund old obli9atlon.

6GSohoenrich,

op.cl~.,

pp. 355-56.

'lDana G. Itunro, IJl~e"eJ'ltioD and Dollar Di810auaCX in
the CaribbeaD 1,00-1921 (lew :ter••y I Jrliice£onnlveraIty
p. 80.

'ra••, I".',
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and to meet new debts.

The fifth, sixth, and ••venth loana,

totaling $4,250,000 were extended in 1893-95 for the purpose
of diacharqing floating debts and quieting indemnity claiD.~

Although not always harmonious, the working relations between
ReuraauK ana the San Domingo Iaprovement Co. were close.

When, in 1895, France threatened to •• iz. the Dominioan cus
tom houses because of tbe dictator's treatment of the French
owned national bank, the San Domingo Improvement Co. came
to hi. a••istance and undertook to payoff the indemnity
which France required and later bou9ht the stock of the
bank and operated it as its own property.

In 1897, when the

Dominican government once again defaulted on the payments of
ita foreign debt, the company carried through another refund

ing operation and undertook to float an e19hth bond 18aue
of

~2,736,750

in bonds at 2 3/. per cent and 11,500,000 in

bonda at • per cent.

~he

i.sue was d••igned to convert all

previous bonds then outstanding and pay overdue interest
while supplying the Dominican government with $1,000,000 in
caah.')

The San Domingo Improvement Co., however, waa not a):)le
to carry out the contract to ita full.at extent because of
a lack of funda.

Bventually the conversion of older bond

ia.uea was completed, but at enormous cost.
62aollander, ge.cit., p. 410.
6)schoenr1ch, Of.cit., p. 357.

'rof••• or Jacob
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B. Hollander reports of the trans.ction a. one which.
• • • involved aut-throat terms, and unchecked
procedure. Instead of the .conomical and orderly
readjustment that waa to put the financial bous.
hold of Santo Domingo in order to re-establish her
public oredit, there reaulted • awollen debit,
loose in con.atruction, 8"IVioiou8 in detail, and
foredoomed to break dOWD.
During Rauraaux' administration the San Domingo
_nt. Co.

I.~

paid the Dominican governll8nt from 30 to 43 per cent.

of t.he face value of the .ecuritiea and in the aain aold
'the:~bonds

not to AlBerioans, but to Europeans, aostly 1n

Belgium and France.
by the bond

Deception of evary type was practiced

.ellers as evidenced by the tact that a large

number of the Prench holders of Doainican bonds vera poor
Catholic peasants in France vho were told that they were
buying securities of the Dominican religious order. 6S other
investors ware attracted by the supposed security afforded
by

the company'. right t.o oollect customs duties and the

quarantee written into each loaQ contract that the company
could ask the Dutcb, Belgian, British, Prench, and United
States governments to appoint a board of commis.ioners to
(Jollect cuato... in ca.. of default:.
The guarantee. proved illusory, hove. .r, as the 001180
t10a agents, who "ere Dominicans t practiced .wry type of

fraud, whicb served only to reduce customs revenues to a
64Ho1 1and8r, op.cit., pp. 410-11.
65 Munro ,

22_cit., p. 81

-
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trickle.

Needless to .ay, though successive defaults occur%8d,

no five power government board was set up to insure payment
on the loans, partly because the various qovernments d!ffemd
over the 1.'01•• they would play, and partly because the San
Domingo Improvement Co. felt they could always find more
gullible investors to line their pockets with silver.

By

the turn of the century, however, it proved nearly impos

aible to sell any aizeable number of bonds, and the ftepub
lic was again in default when Heureaax was a.aaaainated in
July of 1899.
It wa. felt that Heureaux' passinq might usher in a
period of respODsible government, but the huge foreign debt
that saddled the Republic, coupled with the inability of
political leaders to reooncile tbeir differenc•• , dasbed
all auch hopes.
Heuraaux'

In financial matters the worst features of

ad~lniatration

were intensified.

Each succes

sive pr.sident, barried by political rivals, became a more
recklea. borrower, and each new loan v•• obtained upon
harsber terms.

1...

Profe.sor Hollander reports that -the nomi

nal rate of interest upon pUblic loans vas rarely

than

2 per cent per lftOnth, and, with respect to funds or values

actually received, ••veral times that rate.- 66
Hollander

g088

Profe.sor

on to state that on the eve of the establish

ment of the CustOll8 aeoeivershl;tp by the United Statea ill
66Hollander, op.cit., p. 411.
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1905 that Santo Domingo waa found to bel
• • • a cOltf••••d baDknpt, whoa. public faith
v.a 41.0...41t.4 no 1... at. ho.. than in e. .ry fin
ancial az:oket of the world, .mo•• cnll:re,at. debits
wn hawked about a. litt.le beteer thaD w••te paper,
whoa. people ware czu.he4 under a ga1lin9 barden
of t.axation, who.. Dataral reaoUS'C.a were IIOngaged
1A extraYagant or ...!-fraudulent CODc.aaiona,
who. . legiti_te oreditors were left without ~
aatlon or red....s, ud who.e po11tical exiatence
va. threatened by cont.ractual obligations and inter
national al;--t8 in tbe intere.t. of fonip
crecU.tora.
!'he poaition occupied by the San Dom1D90

co.

wa. 1Ulsatiafaotory to all involved parti.s.

Xapro~t

'!'h. coapany

wished. to teJ:Jdnate ita r.spouibi1itie. anet the Dominican
fOverDaent, b ••ded now by Juan X.iAro 3i-'ne., 80re1y
vanted to speea it. vithdr.val as tbe OO1Ipany vas thoroughly
hat.d by Doainic. .s becau.. of ita long association with
seureaux."

The probl•• "a. fiDding securit.y vhioh would

allow the coapany to vit.b4rav without jeopardizinq tbe In\\e
.sts of it. owners.
In spite of hosttle public opinioD,Preai4eDt Ji-*ne.
ill Marcb of 1900 endorsed a plan which would have allowed the

co.pany to contiDue custom. co1l.ctions in return for finan
cial

CODCe••iona.

Prench and Be19ian boDdho14.... , howeftr,

refaaect to aiX88 to further conce••ions and cne .e19iaD
voftmaeat notified the DoainicaD gOftrnaen.t that the coapany
67 Ibid.., p.412.

-

"Melvin M. bight, fte ....I:io_. in auto DoairaSlo
(lIl.v Yorks Vuguud .res., 1121), p.

1,.
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no lon!er repr••ented ita national's intereat.

J1m6ne.,

disfJUst:ed over bi. propo••l be1nq reject.ed, 'terminated the
San Domiftgo Improvement Co.'. right to collect Gusto. . ,

although he ••t up • oomaission to withhold ., per cent of
the custou rece"pta to insure payaent to the bondholders.
What followed was financial confusion.

GoVernments began

to act independently of the San Domin,o Ilapro. . .nt

eo. and

in support of their own citiz.ns,and a confu.ed scraable 8z

the content. of the Dominican

tr.asu~

ensued.

In ..etug a solution, Pre.id.ent 3i-'ne. entnated.
bi. Minister of Foreign Affairs with the ta.k of making .ep
arate arrangements with the Prench and Belqian bondholders

and with the %1BpZ'O"l'eMllt Co.

The n.90tiations proved suc

cessful, but when the Doa1nican Collgn•• approved the a9ne
1II8Dt

with the European bondholders and Dot vi th the Improve

_at Co., ne" aoaplioatiolUl aro•••
'1'0

thi_ point, the UD.ited Stat.e. State

Departaent

bad lent little support to the laprov. . . .t 00.'_ plight,
their only .u9gestion being that the Doa1nican Republic
buyout the bated aGapey.

'!be

obstacle encountend hare,

of cours., .a. DoMinican oppeaition and the lack of funds

to carry tbrou,h such an .91:8....t. 6'
that

With the .qre...nt

'l." the rnllCJh and Belgian bondholders a lien on the

cu.towus of Santo DoIl1DfO anet San Pedro

-

"Ibid.

de

Macori., however,
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the St.au Departaent deoided that Amriou intereats vere
not. going to be .lap1y di.1I1••ed.

Secntary of State John

8ay, di.t.ul:bed over: wbat be tel'Dld -di.criai.aUon againat
Amerioan ca.pani••- informed the Legation at santo Domingo
to

inform tha DoII1nio&DS that tbe .AlRerican government w..

-not dispo.ed to pa•• over unheeded the equities of the

.Aaer1can companie.- and that if all other _thode of
atteaptea .ett.1...nt faile4, the Domi.ioan

gO¥e~"Dt

.hould

allow arbitration. 70
Secretary Hay probably di4 not iot.end that. the Lega
tion vigoroua1y .upport the IJBproYeaent. Co. 'a olai., but

Willi.. P. powell, Mini.ter

to saiti,

wbo carried out Bay'.

inacruct.ions in Santo DoIIiftqo, addre•••d a DOte to the
Dollioioan gOYeraaent. that demanded,1n

.0

unoertain teras, a

.ett.le.at ••ti.factory to the SaD oo.iag'O Iaproveaent co.71

The Stata Department. nprimandad hta for hi. oversealo••

ne.. and hi. failure to .ake alear: that the State Dapart
aent wa. . .rely offeriag ita good offiae. to aftect a
••tt.l....t.

In

.pite of t.hia r:epriaand, however, Powell

w•• instruoted to proceed witb hi• •fforts to persuade the
Doainioan governmaDt to enter into oon.tructive negotiationa
wi th the Impzoy_nt Co•

• eqotlatiolUl in 1901

0_

to nothing and were iDtex

10 Hay to Powell, JIUlUAry 20, 1902, quoted. in JlaDro,
01'-01 t., p. 83.
71J'owall to Hay, february 22, 1902, quoted in Munro,
op.cit., pp. 83-4.

I

rupted in 1'02 vben a revolution ousted Jt.8n.. aDd placed
I

Boracl0 V.sque& ln the President's chair.

When discus.loDs

.er. once IIOre interred into, the Iaprov...nt Co. stale
mated progre•• with ita refusal to suba1t 1ta tinancial
accounts for governmental inspection after it had agreed
to acaept .',500,000 lnstead of the orlgina1 $11,000,000 lt

had de1llaD4ed.

The State Department sugCj8sted the whole

quasUon be s.ttl.d by arbitration but altered itts position
to urge arb:t.trat:t.Oll on only bow the SWI should be. pald. 72
After .uoh political bickeriDg a protocol was signed on

January 31, 1'03, whereby the Doainican government a9reed

to pay the United Stat.s 90veraaent, for the San DoaiDqo
Iaproveaent Co., the sum of $',500,000 in 901d.
in whlch the money was

to be

fte JUDner

paid and the conditions under

which the I.prov...nt Co. would relinquish its properties

were

to

ments.

be ascertained by arbitration between the two govern

Thls brought about the end of prlv*te receivership

and forei9ft creditors were now justified in looking to their
gove:.maen'ta for oollection of debts.
The Dominioan government, under President V4s.ua.,
went ahead with plana to .aleot an arbitral cOlllti••ion, but

• succes.ion of revolutionary uprisings 8ucc•• ~d in plac

inq General

wo.

y Gil, a onetime lieutenant of Keura.us· in

the Pre.ident's abair, who vas opposed to the nevly aigned
72Munro, op.cit., p. 85.
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protocol.

It .a. not. until December that the arb!tral

oommis.ion finally met.

In ita final deoislon the board

fixed the inter.st rate at 4 per cent and stated that the
monthly payments were to be $37,500 a month for two years,
and '41,6'6 a DIOnth thereafter.

In ca•• of falluxe to pay

from cu.tome revenue. secured on the northern coast, a
financial agent of the United State. was to take over the
Puerto Plata oustombou.. and carry out the .gr....nt. 7l
Unfortmaate1y for Dominicans, a new ••rie. of revolu
tionary outbreaks oCO\lrred which diarapted the country and

placed a new

~litary

of the 9OftZ'lUllent.

leader, Carlos Moral•• , at the head

In the face of auch chaoa, it. waa impos
<

sible for the Dominican governaent to make any payments on
the foreign debt. and, in compliance with the tens of the

3uly award, an American financial agent took over the custo...
house of Pu.rto Plata on October 21, 1904.

In HoveJlber

MOral.s .stAblish.d hi...lf .s President, but civil strife
continued unabated a8 the supporters of foraer President

J1men..

continued to ravage the countryside.

In

the fac.

of such uttar breakdown in orderly government, the French,
following the Amerioan exampla, threatened to take over the
Santo Domingo customhous., an action whioh would ha.. para
lyzed the government for lack of funds.
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In its relations with the Dominican Republic in 1902
1903 the State Department concerned itaelf primarily with
settlement of American claims by insisting on arbitration,
a normal part of its work.

Roosevelt and Hay gave no indi

cation that either wished to obtain control of the Repub
lic'. internal operations.

Indeed, at a later date, Roose

velt atated that he thought the pressing of the San Domingo
Improvement Co.'. claim had been a mistake which a criti
cally ill Hay would not have allowed if he had been a well

man. 74
In the first months of 1904, however, Roosevelt' 8
attitude changed .s he began to see the need for policies
which would prevent further inoidents like the Venezuela
blockaqe of 1902.

In Roosevelt'. opinion, the Latin Amari

can nation most susceptible to European intervention was
the Dominican Republic.

Wi th alarm he noted that rivalries

between creditor powera had placed the Dominican government
in a moat unfortunate position and that numerous revolution
ary outbreaks had, in April of 1903, prompted a German war
ship to land 150 men to protect the German consulate. Ital
ian and Dutch shipa a180 entered the harbor. 7S He also
knew that complete anarchy had engulfed the nation in the
Pall and American, Prench, Italian, Dutch, and German ve••els
74 Munro, op.ci t., p. 87.
7SporeiSln Relationa e °E·cit., 1903, p. 391

4'
had landed military peraonnel to protect their respective
foreigD intere.ta. 76 In a letter to J.B. Bishop, dated
February 23, 1904, Roosevelt expressed his attitude,

.t.~

I have been hoping and praying for three .onths

that the Santo .DoJI1Dgana would behava ao that I
would not have to act in any way. I want to do

nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo
Domingo. As tor annexing the island, I bave about
the .... d.sire to annex it a. a gorged boa con
atrictor mlght bave to 8wa110w a porcupine wrong
end-to. If I possibly CaD, I vant to do nothing
to them. If it. is absolutely nec.ssary to do SQae
thing, than I want to 40 as little a. pos.ible. 77
Jtooaevelt proce.ded cautiously, however, .a 1'04 vaa

an election year.

In May, at a banquet commemorating the

aecond anniversary of the independence of CUba, a .b.a_l.lo.D_
eaaal waa releaa.d.

!'

In a speech read by Elihu Root, he

declared that the prinCiple deaire of the United Statea
va.

~to

ae. all neighboring countries stable, orderly and

prosperoua,·

aDd

elaborated

fur~.r

that if a nation demon

strate. that •
• • • it knows how to act wlth decency in in4ua
trial and political mattera, if it k..ps order and
pay. ita obligations, then it n.ed f.ar no inter
ference from the United St.atea. Brutal wrofteJdo!ng,
or an impotence which reaults ln a ,enera1 loosen
iag of the tle. of oivili.84 aociety, may finally
require intervent.lon by aome civilized nat.ion, and

t

7''tulio Manuel Cestaro, Batado. Urai40a
las Antilla.
(Madrid, 1931), quoted in Jone., 02_cl£., p.G!.
77Joseph Buoklin Bishop, 'lbeodore Roosevelt and His

ft_ Shown in Bla OWn Letters
~crlbn.r·s

(2 'VOl•• , Ii" lorE I

lana, 1,1,,1120), I, p. 431.

eliari••
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in the Wes tarn HemsPbere the Dni ted State. can
not 19non this duty. 78

After a decisive victory at the polla in Hove.bar,
Roosevelt, ·oonvinced ot the deavera inherent in the policy
of negation and _diat.ion, "·which he had pur81Nd in the

Vene.Qalan criais, ·eabarked upon a cour.. of pO.itive
action in the OOa1nican Republic 1n 11ne with hi. own char

acter.· 7'

W1th enoouragement froa the MOrales

qovernment,

wbich bad, for some time, desperately appealed for aid,
Roosevelt restated hi. pronouncement of May the 20th in bi.

annual ....age to Conqre••

01'1

December "

1904, apecifically

declaring that.
Chron1c wroDg-doing, or an impotence wbleh
results in a general looseniD9 of the tie. of
c1vi1i•• 4 society, may in Aaerica, as el.ewhere,
ultimately require intervention by aome civil
ized nation, and in the western Hemisphere the
adherence of the United Stat.. to the Monroe
Doctrine may force the United Statea, bowever
reluctantly, in flagrant cas.s of auch wrong
40iJuj or iIIpot.Dce, to
ex.ni.e of an inter
national police power.

.r'e

Following Roosevelt'. addrea.,Bay cabled the American
Minister, Tho... C. Dawaon, on Deoeaber 30, 1904 and directed
78a. 'ringle, Theodore Roosevelt (Nav rork, 1931),
quoted in Dexter perilna, X Ilatog of the Moa.roe !)oouine
(Bo.~on. Little, Brown and eompany, 115S), pp. 231-3'.
7'Howard C. Hill, Ph.D., Roosevelt and the Caribbean
UniY.~.ity of Chicago '~••• , 1,27), p. la8.

(Illinois.

80Ho118e Docu.ment

••••ion), quote

)10.

1

(Pifty-eighth CoDtre•• , third
p. 149.

a in 1111, 0e.cit.,
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him tOI
.0UDd

~h.

Pr••ident of Santo oo.iD90 di.oreetly

but .arae.tly and in • perfectly fr1.Ddly .pirit,
touching the disquieting .ituation which i . devel
oping ovin, to the pre••ure of other government.
h••iAg' ubi ual awarde 1n their fa'VOr and who
regard our award .. conflioting with their rights.
• • • You will .eoertain whath.r the Government of
Santo DoaiD90 would be dispOs.d to request the
anitad States to take ohar,e of the collectioD of
duties and effect an equitable di.tribution of the
•••igned quot.s IUIODg the DoIdnican aoftJ:lllleDt: and
the ....1'.1 clai.-nta. 81
To aid DawaOD in n_fJOtiating • plan that would allow Aaarioan.

representative. to a4a1nl.ter customs collectioD, Roosevelt
arranged tor Commander Albert c. DilllnghD, a Daval officer
po••••• iDg wid_ knowleqe of the island, to a••iat the

Minister in any way he could.
OIl January 20

aD

a9reeaent known •• the Dlllingh....

S~chez protocol vaa .19De4, providlng for a guaranty by

the United States 90ve:maeJlt of Dominican t.rritorlal integ
rity and for control of all Doainlcan customhou••• by the

United State..

Debate over certain details, .uoh a. the

clau•• guaranteeing Dominican territorial inte,rit.y, delayed

the COJIIpletioD of negotiationa UIltil February 7, 1905,

wheD

a Dew pzotocol wu 8igned which .tipulate4 that. the United
States .hould tum over to the Dominican 90ver_t. 45 per

cent of all custoM r.venu.e While Wlinv the reaaiDing 55 per
cent. to ••nice the Republic'. fore190 and 4omesUo debt..
8180u.. DoaUMIlt. 80. 1

••••1on),

(Fifty-ninth Con9n•• , fir.t

qaotil In DIll, !i_oit., pp. 158-59.
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It wa. al.o agreed that the unit.ed State. would grant. the
Itepublic ...1.tanae in rIIstori.ng the oredit, pre...:v1n'l the
order, anel fo.t.tu:1ng . .terial PI'09"•• for t.he welfare of
her oiti••n8. 82
In subia.t. tt..b, the protocol to the Senate on rebruary
15, 1905, ,nsielut RooMvelt urged it. accept.ance, saying
that the United Sat•• gover_nt. coulch
• • • not vl'th propriet.y .ay that it. will pro
tect. it. ow cU:i..na and inter.ata Oil the one
hand, ud ye' on t:be other hue! refue to allow
other 90veraaant. to protect their citiaens and
iaun.'.. • • • £ia4 caut.ioned thaj those who
profit by the Nollroe Doct.rine aWlt. acaept certain
r ••poa81bilit.i.s aloftg with the ri,ht. which it
GOllf.r.~83

Bncounter1ag oppoaition within the Senate, evan though the
Senate poreign Belation. Caa.!ttee reooamended approval,
Roo.evelt, in • •peclal ....a'. of Naroh 6, 1905, 8tre••ect
the poat tbat. I
Saato Doaiago ,r1evou.ly 11. .4& the a14 of •
powerful and friendly natlon • • • She ha. a.ked
for thi. aid, and the expre.aloaa of friendshlp
repeatedly suct.iODed by the people and Govem
. .nt. of the United St.ate. warrut her in belie...
1Dg
it will not be withheld in the hour of her
need.

"tt

In an atteapt to rally Amerioan opinion behind the
treat.y in a apeech given at the Chautauqua in Mev York, he
appealed, in the word. of Prof•••or J. Fred tippy, -to 'the

81.oreil! Relation., op.cit., 1'05, p. 342.

-

8'Ibld., p. 334.
84llichardson, op.oit.., XV, pp. "50-51.
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.tad ad sent1aents of the aYerage

lUll,·

and stated forth

rightly that..

w. canDOt peZ1l&DeDtly adhere to the Monme
DootriAe ula.. we
in _akinv i 1: evident
in the fir.t place that we 40 DOt iDtend t.o tna'
it • • • as aa exou. for a"randi.e.Dt 011 our
part at. the expeue of the rapublics to the .outh
of . . , aecond, that we 40 not inUD4 to peJ:ait it
to be a••a by aDy of
republios . . • shield
too protect that republic frOlS the oonsequences of
its own mid••da a,aiD.t. foreign fte tiona, third,
that ina_ach .. by thi8 doot$iDe "e prevent. other
nation. f¥Oa interf.riD9 on thi• •i4e of the water,
we .bal1 our.el. . . in ,ood faith t.ry to h.lp t.ho••
of our ai.tar republioa, .,hioh aeed auch help,
upward toward peaae and order. 85

.1lOC...

th...

Boo. . . .lt.'. exhortat.ion. failed to convince the Sena

ton, howe••

r, a.

they

".re

\1DIlOVed by benevolence, fear

of Buropean int.rvent.ion, concern for ve.ted int..re.t., or
expansionist. lapul•••••'
ity n.eded for

app~al

seeing that. the t.wo-thil!'Cbl major
could not be obt.ain.d, Boo••Y81t.

allow.d the . .tt.er to be .et. aai4e unt.il the Senate opened
ita regular ••••ion. in Deceeer.

When, on ICarch 18, the

United St.ate. Senate adjounea without acting on the protocol,
rD8Dr8 of revolut.ion .pread throughout the oapital aDd for
eign credit.or. nnewed. their c1eaan4a for payaent. of.·clai...
'1'0

wor..n the situat.ion, an It.alian crui•• r anohored in Santo

DoaiJl90·. harbor to lu4 .upport. tor It.aliu. olai...

ADa.

cri.i. had arieen.

'J.aea,

85••., fork
Aug'WIt. 12, 1905, quoted in J. rnd
Rippy, -!'be InitialIOD of the Cu'toaa lecei.er.hip in the
Doad.n1oaa Republic,· .lepanic ~riou. Hi.tozoic Bevi..." XVII
(RoYeaber, 1'37), p. ass

"tippy, cm.oit., p• •51.
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1D the face of upending di•••ter, the Dolainicu Min
Ister of riDuce Infozmad Dawson that be could aontinue in
bi. posltion only if a praa_ioal .odu• •J.vaadi va. adopted,
pending ratification of the tzeaty.87

the claiaanu, and finding only the

navaoA sounded out

I1Ip~Dt

Co. unreoep

ti"., cabled the Doadnicaa propoaal to W.ahington.

Roo••velt

approved the propo••d arraDgeaeDt, but aade it clear that
all po.ts lIould be .ffected, which _at that the IIIpZ'O.e. . .t
Co. would 10.e ita

control of the northern cuatomhouse..

the lDODey collected, C5 per
inioan

9~nt

CMftt

Of

vas .amarked for the Doll

vb1le 55 per cent va. to be placed in a

Rev l'ork bank until the Senate t:aUf1ed the treaty, in which
ca•• it would then be distributed ..aD9 the c1aiaant. 1n
proportioa. to their claba.
Roosevelt'. pzoposa1. were accepted and the Morale.'
governmeat signed iato effect the Receiver.bip
lt05.

Within a Ie. week.

aoo....lt

OD

March 31,

nomiaated, and Moral••

appoiated, Colonel Georg- a. COlton, a long-t1.aa custo...
collector 1n the Philippine Ielaaa, .e Ceaera1 Receiver and
Collector.

Speak in, later before the S. .ate, aao.velt

justified the Receiver.hip by ••ying that,

• • • •tability and order and all the beneflU
of peace an at 1a.t coai.n9 to suto Doad.Dgo, daD
PI' of foralp intervent.ion baa been ."pea&ld, ud

878i1l, OR.olt., p. 161.
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there i . at lut I,pro.pect that all creditors
will get ju.~10••

Boo....lt'. action. touched off a torrent of abu..

aqain.t hi. in the senate.

Pol1owin9 the le.d of SeDator

IIoqu of Alab. . ., who had .......4
eitn Relationa since 1879,

SeDa~

OD

the COIIIlitt_ on FOr

critic. denounced bis cause

a. \1Doon.titutioaal, .ayiA, that. he had ·put into executloa
a treaty wbieb the Senate bad l'ef"••4 to approve and that h.

had e.tabli.h.d a proteotol'ate oyer Santo Doaln90.·S9

!b.

1IIIOcl• • vivendi, however, e.tablisbed. financial oxel.r aDd the

Dominican ,ov.r_nt received IIOra ina it• •5 per cent.
shan than it had froll a pre.ioWl 100 per cent, further, the

Aaerleaa Receiver Gene...al, Colonel Colton, note4 that ch1:r:ing

it. tweaty-ei,ht .onth. of operation, ·not one .ingle

c~

plaint Dor lb. of critici•• wa. received frOJll the Doadnicaa

Govemmeat., nor. troll any consul or .pec1al Z'.pr••entatiftl.·90
'lbe n.oWl41ng succes.

of the .adas
Ylvendi ai484
• u _
I

aoo....

. .It in ••curiD, approval by the senate, an4 the executi"
a"ne_nt was replace4 by • formal treaty which want into

.ffect on July 8, 1907.

The treaty contained the principal

f.atures of the 1'05 aqAe.nt., omit.ted, howe...r, was the

a"n.ment of the United State. to respect the t.rritorial
integrit.y of t:be Doaf.Dican ..public (in defennee t.o S8Ilatol:ll

.aporei!! Belation., o,.cit., 1'85, p. 36_
a'Hill, OR.cit., p. 161
90 roreig! Ralatio•• , 0E.cit., 1107, p. 323
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who felt theze was little

diffe~Doe

between r.specting and

9Urant.eeiD.9 a Dation's territorial inte9rity) • •nd the
clauee wbich pledged a•• i.taDce by the United State. for
the purpo.. of pn.erviDg oder, which was obj.cted to OD.

91'OUDd. t:hat -the pZ'O'Y'i.icm would involve the United state.
in the internal affaira of Santo no.ingo.-'l

It was alao

agreed that the DoaiDican goYeJ:Jll8lt would not iDcr•••• it.
public debt eaoept by previous agzee..nt with the United

Stat.s until the full aaouDt of it. foreign obligations had
been paicl.'Z
By 1904 flnaDoi&l ai.aan.....nt bad brought the Doaini
caD

Rep1i1blic perilously clo.. to Buropean inteZ'Vent.ion.

In

an .ffort to .ta. . off suoh a thnat, which a!9ht ha. . lad
to in4efbi t.e ocnpatiOD clo.. to AaerioaD shorea. ..asblDg
ton foWid bers.lf

ODoe lIOn

deeply lnvolv.. In DaaliDlcan

.ffalrs.

President Roose.elt, with the

CoZ'Ollaq

t.o

p~19ation

the MoftZ'oe Dootrine. .",.4 quickly

of hi.

to e.tablish

• CUstOlU be.i".raMp, which .at.isfied the cluoring foreiCJD
creditors ad era. ." the threat of

It was belleved that .uGh

aD

fo~i9ll

iDt.neatioll.

arru,,_nt. would .lso

bring pe.ce to the islu4, but rewrring disorders wi thin
the island . .public deaw.matrata4 tbe weaJul••s of such .. hope.

91Bi1l , op.cit., p. 167 •

•arorait! ..lations,

!p.cit., 1907, pp. 307-09.
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III

aD

at:tellpt to eDd the raO'U'riD9 oyola of insurrectloDs

in the DOmiDioan . .public the N1ls0D

Adainis~atioD

broad

eaed United atate. 1Dvol-..-nt, aDd Roosevelt'. plan, whlch
was so .4a1.I'01. in ita qualitie., bee_ but the firat of

a ••1'1•• of

.te,.

tion in 191'_

tha~

led ult.lJRata1y to llilitary occupa

CHAP'Rlt III

THE WILSOH

FOIBIGH POLICY

ADMI.IS~RATIOK·S

I. IJ.'BB DONINlCU REPUBLIC

Sinee tme DoIIiDican 1tepablic·. inception as an inde
pendent nation in 1844, Uaited States foreign policy had
centered

around the i4.. t:hat.

the

tiDy islan4 ..public

.uat Myer be dominated by a fonip power.

To forestall

foreign incursioD, tbi. policy had led to atteapta at anne.a
tiOD in the nineteenth century and to the e.tabliahment of
a cuatoaa reoeiYerabip in 1905.

While the W11son adaiDietra

tioD adhered to the .st.abliahed policy in respect. to foreip
incursion, PnsideDt Wilson broadened United Stat•• iawlve
aaat ia the affaira of the . .public by iasiating on the
.stabliah. .at of a constitutional 4e.oaracy whioh, in hi.
mincl, v.a necessary to put an eDd to the reourriag cyale.

of revolution.
fiDaacial

When it bec_ evident that political and

.~ility

were not to be so easily obtained,

Wilson reluctantly ordered the aepublic occupied by the
.arin.s, who were then to • 1netruct· tile DoIIinicana in the
"aye of d..oaracy.
In the years iaae4iately follOWing ita ••tabliahaent,
the cuato. . receiverahip ••tabliah. . by Booa.velt ".. a

financial success.

SpaakinCJ of the advantag.s gained, the
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I

DoII1nlcan Miniater of ,irumce, 'ederico Velaaque., in hi.

i._

auual report for 1906, stated that.

The
of "avenue 4uriD9 1'05 and thoae of
ItOI apeak clearly, with reaewed eloqaence, of
fi91lre., that for SOlIe ti_ paa~ we have beeJl
livln~ in the public poata a life of order and
hoaesty, where but. a few years a90 lif. with fe"
exceptions within aDd without the Dational pal
ace .a. ODe of shamele8ane•• , dilapidation,
cupidity, an4 peraaaent disgrace for the Republio,
being the prinCipal cau••, if not ~le only one,
why our weak atate:.haa felt. itself JIOre tho
once treablin9 Oft the brink of the aby•• , and that
for a lon, t.t.. we have found our.elve. laCking in

ecolloaU.o ."t!oQoay, O'ftrwei9hed by debu, _justi
fiable for the Inater part, ••fferia9 insult.
and hwdlitie.. :I

Unint.ernpt.ed ,.ace clJ.d

ter 'l'h0BlA.

c.

O..,80D

no~

follow, but the AIlericaD. Minis

reported to St.ate Deparu.nt officials

that revolutionary plotttat had abated beea••e of the inabil

ae

i ty of n'9'Olutionule. to plWl4er the collecUon po.ta.

al.o reported that aqrloalture and cattle rai8ing were again
flouri~iD9

and

that, for the firat t.ime, public officials

were recelv1nv their .alari•• on .ebedule.'4

Onder

aa.6a Cacere.

(Pre.ident 1'06-1911), relation.

wi t.h the Oni ted. Stat.. .ere haD\OD!ou..
trua~

~cen. laspired l

in hi. admiDi.tratlon by appoint.iBg able aen and

in..iatuu, on hon•• ty in goveX1lMDt.

It was beeaWie of thi.,

iD part, that hi. pre.idenay "a. one of the fne.t., BlOat

peaoeful, a4 con.t.nctJ..... ia the Republic·. hiat.ory.

Ilponi,! RelatiODB, or.cit., 1907, p. 357.

94 Xbid ., 1905, p_ 379_

But
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at a tiae WIleR the tutue . . . .a brighte8t, Dca1DiCaDa were
.tart.lea by the Dew. of Caceres' ......ination on November
19, 1911.

'.fhe country

then fell into the banda of General

Alfredo M. Victoria, COBIIlUder of the Republic'. ailituy.

Being only twenty-six year8 old, he v.. Dot of conatitutional
.,e to be PH.J.d.ent, but intl:ipea to .ecure the election of
hi. uncle, B18dio Victoria.

~he

90. .~nt va. quickly

COIlWtrt.e4 into a 8tark ailitary dietat.oraMp and • 11\Dlbel:

of leading political

and

atlitary leader. rai••d the stand

ard of "volt aDd. OGoupie. parts of tbe nation fro. which

they refused to be 4i8lodged.

In Waabington the di8rup

tiOD ca.t lIOn thaD • litt.le doubt upon the inf.llibility

of the Rooseveltiall pnaorlpt.ioa for: ••int..inn9 the peace
of the Carib_aD, and -rai••• the que.tiOll ot "bether

~

Mre control of cuatGlla wa. a cODclu.ive re.e4y for do.at.ic

di..order... ~S

W••hingt.on at fir.t 8upported the

2!

facto regime,

.arniDg the revolutioniat.. that it "a. the practice of the
United st.t.. -to refu.e to recogni.e any government re.ult
ing fro. a revolution
will of the people. u9 '

~1e..

it. appear. to repre.ent the

aevolutionary oppo.ltiOD. bowever,

was too foraidab1e for W••hington to overlook, and wben it
bec_ apparent after IIOftth. .)f figbtin9 that the atX1l991e
9Sperkia•• !R_cit., pp. 254-55.
91"~19! Bel.tiOG., gp.oit., 1912, pp. 341-42.
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wa. a aeadlock, the United State. government offered its
good offices with a view of re-establishing peace and order
in the troubled aepublic.'7
Acting on the recommendations of the American Minis
ter to Santo Domingo, William W. Russell, who was up.et by
the closure of interior customhous.s by the fight1n9,98 a

speoial commission appointed by President Taft, oonsisting

of Ceneral Prank Molntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs
of the War Department and Mr. W.'1'. Doyle, Chief of the Latia
Alaerican Division of the State Department, arri".d in Santo
Domingo on october 2 to investigate the existing aituation.
They were also acoompanied by 750 Marin•• , whose duty it
wa. to protect the custollhou... , if it bec_ nece••ary to
do so.

Upon their arrival in Santo Domingo, the Commi••ioners
aelvis.a the President, Bladio Victoria, to declare a general
amnesty and remove i ___di.tely his nephew, General Alfredo
Victoria, froa hi. duties .a Minister of War and Interior,
and to co-operate pr08lptly with the Amerioan Minister
Russ.ll 1D n ... tabli8hing

to

working order the interior

cu.teahouse., and finally, -to make all other reforms ne.d
fUl for the protection of

~.venue.

and the re.toration of

97wel1e., !I_cit., II, p. 697.
98Munro , op.Gl~.t p. 261.
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quiet and content throughout the Republic.-"
Victoria .....4 willlng to ....nt to

~.

At firat,

-su9q••tion.- of

the co-i•• ionera, but later proved recalcitrant.

1ft the

face of Victoria's .tubbonme•• , -the respons. of the Unitea
Stat•• wa. that in view of ai.u•• of fund. in the pa.t,
inat.ructi0ll8 would be given to the General Receiver of
Doainican CUsto.. to oe.8e all payaent. to the e.tablisbed
90"erzment.-100

In the .... vein, no revenue. wen to be

9i'Nn to the rebel. and lilly go.... nament ••tabli.bed by tb..
would not be reoogni••d.

Left virtu.lly pennil••• , Victoria

re.igned on Bovaaber 26, 1912 and the DominioaD Congre ••
• ettled down to electing • oandidate acceptable to the war
ring faction••
On

November 30, 1912 the Doainican Con9re•• elected

the portly Adolfo Nouel, Archbi.bop of Santo Domingo, a.
provisional pre.ident.

The choiae of the aaiable Nouel

brought an u..41ate ce••ion of bostilitie.

Oo.mi•• ionera, accompanied

by the

and

the

750 Marine., left for the

United State. witb the aituation apparently in hand.
9004 Archbishop, howe"er,

w..

~rican

The

not of forceful charact.er, &l'ld

after four IIODtha he retired to Buropc\r, collplaining of ill

heal th.

I'riet.ion bet.ween political faotion. cont.iDuea. to

"Quoted in Well•• , op.cit., II, pp. 695-96.
lOO.ilfrld Hardy Cal1cott, ~he Caribbean POliE! of
(sal£llIO"1 JObn 10p1ii. pn88,

the united. state., 1890-1920

1,42),

p.

2'1.
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incre.se and by the end of March -the newly

ins~alled

Wilson administ.ration found an inextricable muddle onlits
band., which Bryan, a. Secret.ary of State, proceeded to
complicate by the worst possible appointments.· 1Gl

Informed Dominicans hoped for a chan,. in policy
under the Wilson adainistration, as both Wilson and his
Secretary of State Bryan were avowed ·anti-i.periali.t.•• •
It seemed rea.onable to expect such a change, a. Wilson had
announoed that the polioy of the United States toward Latin
Aaerica would be one based on equality and that Washington
viabed to bring into existence a spirit of .utual identifi
cation and solidarity on the ba.ia of mutual appreciation •
.Aa he hi_elf expressed itl

What we deaire to do, and wbat we shall do, is
to show Qur neig'hbors to the south of ua that

their interests are ident.ical with our inter•• uI
that we ha.. no plans or any thoUfJhts of our own
exaltation, but have in vie. only the peace and
the prosperity of the people 1n our bemiephere. 102
Indead, when Wi180n·. administ.ration as.wae4 power
·it would,· in the word8 of Dana C. Munro, ahave baen hard
to

fores.. tbat hie aciadniatration would go farther than

any of its predeoessors in int.ananiag in the internal affaka

of s.~ral west Indian republios.-10 3
lOlKni9ht, 02.c1t., p. 51

l02Quote4 ift . . lles, op.oit., II, p. 114.
l03Mun~, 0R.oit., p. 269.
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In theory, Wilson'. pronouno. .ents were exceptional

in view of past poliaiea, and created a favourable iapre.aiDa
throughout Latin America.

In fact, however, what w•• later

produoed was a .eri.. of well-intentioned blunder. that led
ultiaately to military ocoupation.

A large .h.re of the

blame tor early failure in the Dominioan Republic mu.t be
placed on Seoretary of State Willi.. Jenning_ Bryan'.
shoulders, a ••
• • • the Secretary, while emotionally raapon
.ive to the ideali•• of the theorie. eDunciated
by President Wi180n, was incapable of qr••pin9
intellectually the .anner in ¥.bieb tho.. theories
IIl1gbt be trans.uud into the daily rouUn. of
hi. DepartMnt.. It. va. notoX'ioua that the great.
majority of the diplomatic appointee. .ent by the
Wil.OD Administration to Latin &aerie. pos•••s.4
no qualification for their taak other than that of
loyalt.y to the Deaocratio puty. But nowhan • • •
vas this ineptitude in the ••lection of agants to
carry out the Wilson policy -.ore laMlltebly demon
.trated than in the 8fpoiDt.lD8Dts lRade to the
no.inican RepUblic. 1
In defen•• of Pre.ident WilsOD it .ust be admitted, ..

ChesteX'

L.

Jon•• not•• , that -the probleu which bera, ••

els.where, coftfEOftted the wilson administration involved
peculiar difflculti•• which it. i. not by .any . . . .a 8ura

that a better-cho.en .et of official. could have overooae.~5
Wh.n W1180n took office he found the DoaiDican Repub
lic in turmoil.
two

On

April 14, the DoIIiniean Congre•• , .fter

,

tortuous weeks of deliberation, elecuc.i Ger..ral Jo..
104.811•• , 02_cit., II, p. 717.

l05 Jone., oR.oit.., p. 111.

I

Borda. Vald•• a. provisional president for

ODe

nev president., failin9 t.o inspire confidenoe

y.ar.

UlODC)

The

all

political factions, va. gn.ted by rebellion only on. day

after hi. inaugurat.ion.

~be

.ituation continued to decay,

and by Septeaber the revolt had reaohed major proport.ion••

In the _anti. ., Preaident. Wilson, on Secntary of St.ate
Bryan'a reeo_nution, appointed a. Mini.ter to the strife
ridd.n Republio, one J . . . . Mark Sullivan, wboa. only quali

fication was that he bad baen a loyal aupporter of the De.....'
oratic party.106
After hia appointment Sullivan waa ordered to pro

O8ed u.e41ately to Santo uoaingo and "aa inat.ruct.ed by

S.cretary Bryan to infora the revolutionary leader. thet
the influence of the UDit.ed State.

gOvemMDtl

• • • would be exert.ed for the support of lawful
authoritiea in Sa.to Doaingo, and for the diacour
g._at of any and all inaurnctiouary mathoda • • •
~i
tJu,t.e

that thia 90vernaeat would ..,ly afford legit
_ana to a.ai.t in the reat.oratioa of. order
Del in the prevention of further in.urrect1ona,
holding 1ta81f bound at all tt..a to advia. w1th
the GoverDaeftt 1n beh.i570f t:boa. who 'eal that
the,. ha. . a grievance.

While .1'1 rout. to Santo 00.11'190, Hr. Sullivan rece1wd
aDoth.r cOII1IWllcatioa from Secretary Bryan in which be .a.

in.tructed to conv.y the followift9 .....V. to the rebel
1.aa.~8

ift

PU.~to

Plata.

The .....,. waxned the

~.volu-

lO'Knight, op.cit., pp. 35-54.
l07poreil! Relationa, ae,cit., 1913, pp. 425-26.
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tionui•• that., under the toenail of t.he 190' agl'8ell8llt, the

United St.ata. would •
• • • DOt con.ent. that. the DOII1Dlcan Govemment
incre••e 1t. debt. for tbe purpo.. of payia! the
revo1ut.ionary expens.. and c1ataa. • • • ADet
.hould the revolution 8ucceed, th1. GoYemaent.
would withhold recognition of the de facto ,0V8rn
.anc, and ooll8aqueat1y wi thbold th8 porlIon of
the austau collecUcm. be10ngiftg to Santo Doalago
a. lCD9 aa -1wancopi••4 de facto 90verruaeat

abould exiat.

08

--

Wben the above threat, col1taiDift9 certain featurea
that did Dot .... to be covend by the t.reaty of 1907, taile4
to end.

bo.tJ.litle. between the Bordas 9ova:ru1ent. and the

insurrectionist.., Seoretary Bryaa, actlDg on the Reo_da
tion. of Miniater Sullivu, Bent three State Depart.D.t. offi

clals and thlrty ...istant. to .upervise t.he Con9ra•• lonal
election. In December 1:0 ilUlu. a fair election.

'this act..icn,

certainly DOt. provided for by the 1907 tn81:YI
• • • CDD.titute. the firat evidence of formal
intenentioD by the United stat..s in t.he intenal
aff.in of the DoIIiaicaft . .public. • • • lind ab.olNd
ail: '.1nor••• in9 4i.nt"4 for the .overeign r19ht.B
iDherent. in 'the DoIdniaan people ¥hlGh led ine.
itably to tile DliliHP' occupatioa of the Republic
three year. later.

The Wilaon

a4llinist~atiollla

effoJ.'ta for peace, vbile

questionable, had thu far beea auoe•••ful.
of Pn.ieSeDt Borda. had to ac1a1t

were orderly and fair.

~at.

the

Evea critic.

Dec"'~

election.

Yet the oppOaition va. Dot a.tl.flad,

108rore l1! "lations, 02.01t.., 1913, p. 421.
10'.all•• , op.cit., XX, p. 726.
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and political and economic CODditlon. within the island
steadily wore_ned during the opening
the be9inDln9 of

man~bs

of 1914.

At

1'14 the Bord.s gOverDJl8Dt, through ais

managa__at of fUDd. aDd because of large expenditure. u.e4

to curtail revolutionary .otivity, owed $3'6,000 for back

salari.s and over $740,000 in clai...

CODgression.l ....

bara threatened to cau._ abao. if their December .alari.s
were not paid and it beo_ olear to the aute Depart.Jaent,
after adYancinCJ the Bor4as AdaiDist.ratiOll $40,000, t.hat it
auat once more ,ive consideration to the Dominioan 9Overn
.entls need for a .i.eabie loan.

Secretary DryaD. shC:JlJfin9 a d••ire to exerci.. • 4egne

of control

0 . .1'

the intemal affaire of the Republic, instn.cbo

a4 MiDistar Sullivan to .uIge.t to Bordas that $1,200,000 _f
the 1'07 bonda, up to tlds t1lle d•• tined for expenditure 1ft

the area of public work., could be sold to pay back .alaries
and pre••ing clat.a,OD the condition that aloohol and tobaoco
taxes be increa.ect to rei_ur.. the public work. Iud, and

em the further .tipulation that an American finucial expert
be sent to Santo Doa1n90 to . . .ist in . .ttars of account

ing aDd budgetary oontrol with a view of helping officials
to

prevent a deficit.

it w••

a9~..4

Bordas aocepted this propoaal when

that the aua would be

inc~e •••d to

$1,600,000,

bu.t Bordas' eneal•• in Congre•• blocked the ....ur. un1:il
April, in order to cawae hill financial embarra•••nt.

It . .

fi"ally anaDged that the -financial expert.- would be at:ta::-.s

'6
to the CllstoJUI

nceiverahlp ue! that he would po••••••OM

deqree of power in connection with the
cial administration. 110
lUll

g-ove~t's

finan

Charle. M. Johnston, a coapatent

with experieace in Mexico and t.he west lAdies, wa.

selected by President Wilson to fill the poal tlon.

By now Wl1.on w.a watchin, the deteriorating political
. ituation with ql."OWing cOIlcern.

III Aug-ust he assumed more

dir.ot control by applying to the DoIlinicaa Republio the
·Wilson PleA.-

Wilsoa'. plan reaffirmed the altruistic pur

pos•• of the United State. but declared that if coa.tructi. .
benefits vere to aeone to the DoII.inioaD naUon, the firat
order of busines. va. to balt all armed bostilities.

This

done, he then .ufte.tad that t.he political leaders ohoo. .
a proVisional pre.ident who would then arrange for elections
for both the Presidency and COnqrea..
be .upervi.ed by

Aaerican ob••rYera

The elections wou14

to lnaun fairne.. an4

Wa.bington would then rec09fti... the .1.cted,v90vemaent a.
one repre••nting- the people'. wi.h...

Once the goverlUl8Dt

a.su.-d office, no further revolutioas would
by the unit.ed St&tfa..

be pera1t:ta4

All cban,es were haAceforth to be

made via the COnstitutional route. lll

W1leon's plan .....4

to follow and ...n exceed the .arlier dictate. of Secretary

Dryu, for the .pealal comai.s1onera appointed by 're.idant

110,orel,ft Belatioos, op,cit., 1914, pp. 236-37.
1111'";Jbid.,
,
pp. 247-48.

-

'7
Wilson. t.o ••acute his p18l1 in Sant.o DoIIiDgo ".re inst.ructed

thu,ly,i
,
/

\

,/

·.0

opport.unity for uguaent ahould be 9iven to

any per.on or faction.

It i. desired that you pre••nt the

plan and ... that it i. oomplied with.· 112

According to the

.st.te Su.nel.' well•••
President Wilson t.plied that the 90ver.a.ent of

the Inited St.t•• po••••••d the right to ...ure

it.elf of the continuaao. of orderly oon.tltu
tioaal g.".m.ent in t.he DomiDic.. ..public, and
would · '••1 .t liberty· to pr.".Dt all chap. in
the Qo".~t of the DoII1nicaa Republic other
Chu thos. by 'the ·pe.a.fullifO"•••• • provided in
the Dominioan Con.titutlon.
Wllson·. co_i.aioun, the foraer Go"ernor of Mew

Jer..y, ftaDltl1n 'on, aDd Charles Sa1th, • New R.mp.hlre
attomey, .ecur.d acoeptance of the Wilson

.1_

the principal le.ders except Desiderio Arias.

from all

nere1lpOn,
/

,

Pre.ideat Bord.. Hsigned and a phy.ioian, Dr. ....n BU.,
a soa of BuenaYeDtura B.e., Who bad n4W8r active1y eD,aged

1a politic., was .lected Provi.lonal Pre.ide.t on Aug•• t
.

,

.ollowing hi. inauguration, 're.ident ••e.,

27, 1914.

after consult.ing with the United St.t•• Ca.a1••ioaers,

.1.'

ranted for natlonal elect.ion. for: a Pre.ident od • C0ft9re

to be beld in .ix weeks.

It waa al.o .gree4 that. the elec

tion. WOuld be ob.erved by Aaerioan repre.ent.atl".. to in. . .
f.il'll••••

fte principal clIDdiaat.ea wen of the two historic

112 Ibid., p .. 247.
113.ell•• , op.oit., II, p. 738.

-

6.

I

!:!!.'

aDd Boracio V••que_ the Horaci.taa.

place

Oft

Ji_ne..
~

. .de

The electlon. t.ook

October 25 and ...sultee! in a naZ'1'OW "ictory for

It _to be noted, however, that. the Jta*ua force•
t.portaat political deal. which In.area victory.

one va. vith • thlrd party oandidate, Federlco Velaaque.,
wbo v.. persuaded. to throw bi. 'tOtal .upport. t.o J1Mne. In

return for control of 2S per cent of the job. 1.11 the
9ove~t,

DeW

and the other w•• wlth Desiderio Arias who, tor

hl• •upport, wu proais" • cabinet po.ltion.

secretary

Bryan, col1v1aa.d \:be elec1:1oD. bad represent.eel t.be vill of
the people, ueland

Oft

ROYGlber 14, 1914 that.

Tbe per10d of re'VOlut.1on. 1s p •• t,
wll1 De sl1pported, a.c••••ry nfo.J:IU
through 189islatiOA. It i8 believed
.ach • policYl"aoa vill be followed

and PX'09ns••
Por a fleeting __ nt, lt .....d u

law and order
will be u.r98d
that \U.'lder
by pro.perity

lf the tlny natlon

would enter upon an .ra of peace ud pro.parity, but the
I

In.iat.ance of the State Departaent that J1JI1Iiaell place the
collection of .lat.enal revenue. under the neeiverahip . .4

9iveCharle.

M. John.toD, tbe

·f1Aanaial expert,· offlcial

nCogIlitioD . . GODtxoller, .oon broW)bt revolt once more

t.o the Latin "public.
tic

refo~

~t

'fhe s'tate Departaent felt that

~

were n••ded if 4eaoOracy vere to flouri.h anc!

the area which ...484 the

.,.t at.lenUoD v••

114poreil! Relation., !lecit., 1914, p. 256.

the ada1n

tetration of government finance..

"

Such. proposal wa. Dot

ea1au1ated to oa... much furor a., during and after the elec
torial O_pe190, .uhiogton had r • •i".4 a••urancee in
I

writiag fso. 3i. .e. aDd the ot.ber oaDdi4ate. tbat t.bey

wen in favor of placing the intemal raYeD..... under the
netoma receivership.llS
That rafoD was needed cannot be denied.

Barlier

loan. to Al'chlDl.hop Noue1 haa. been squaIlc1ered. in suppres
.ing "-.olt., and short-tent loan. approved for .arioua

projeot. had beea ai.u.ea and intereat paymeats were long
overdue.

To

add to thi. finucial mi.ery, there were prac:

tical1y ao tax receipt. available to the

q09a~t

a. the

Bordas adaini.tretion bad per.uaded . .rebant. and 1nduatr1
aliet. to pay their taxes in advanoe in retarn for a reduced
rate.

Preaideat Ji.bw• •aa also confronted with an Ariaa

clominated auiat and ·atuapt. at refora had no further
result than to stiaulat. violent oppo.ition••116

.a41y,

Pre.idliBt. ' "i_Il•• j. ,now aged aDd 1nfixa, contributed to the

deterioratioD of 1:he aitaation througb hi. lack of anergy
in adopting stroDg me.aura••

It va. in Pebru&1'J' 1'15, ollly a . .ek after the Pr••i
deBt'. inaquration, that Seoretary Bryan, ••ekinq to enlaqe

in ecope hie ult1uce policy of .....tin' the ult,1mate dec1aial'
115M\mro, !R.ait.., p. 2'1_
116 Sc:hoenrioh, !2.ci~., p. 90.
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ragar4ing tbe domestio poliei.s of the Doainioan Government
in the hands of representative. of the United State., inI

foraed Pr••ident Jimenez that ha was expeoted
aal reC09nit.ioll to Mr. Charl••

M.

to

extend tor

Johnston, wilsOD'. appoin

tee .a ·financial expert,· a. Comptroller of the Finances
of the Dominican aepublic, and that hi. duties would be tOI
• • • provide .. bud9at for the Dominican Republic
baaed upon hi. knowledge of ineome and probable
expenditure., thia budget to be ri9idly adhered to,
to approve and counteraign any payments aada by the
Dominican Govemaant, it being Wlderstood that no
paymenu be va.li4. unl••s countersigned by the Comp
troller. ll7
In ad4ition, internal reveaue w.a to be plaoed under the
recelverahip and public works were to be put under an Ameri
can, accountable only to the Unit.ed State. State Depara.nt.
It va. alao augge.ted that United Stat.a as.istance be

0"

taioea for organizing a conatabulary offic.red by United
States peraonnel that would replace the Dominioan Army.

Tbe

latter .tep waa aean a. one that would irrevocably put an

end to political diaturbance.
When Ji~ne. attempted to obtain the approval of the'
DOIIinican Congre.. to Secretary Bryan'. propo.ed _aaur•• , he
was treeted by at1ff OPPOSition from the Hoxacist. Senatora

aDd from the cronies of Arias.

Aria. argued against tollow

int united States dictate., but it w•• gen.rally recogni••d
117poreii! Relationa, 0e.c1t., 1915, p. 297.
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that his opposition.
• • • was due to the fact that the President
waa unable to incr.... the subsidy which he had
already cODman.ad to pay him and was unwilling to
c.~ry out all of Arias'
with ~9ard to
goveromentalappointments.

4-t1re8

Jimenez feebly pre••ed for acceptance of Washington'.
propo.al that Johnston be given official r.cognition aa
controller, but when the Dominican Congress twice refused
hi. request, he took the position that Johnston could have
no legal authority.

The State Department was determined to

atand firm, bowevaJ:', and lnai.ted that Johnston continue to

counteraign all checks covering governmental expenditures.
Aa a result, -th_ status quo continued for 80me montha, witb

constant friction between the controller and the President
and with little beneficial effect on the Republio's financDl
aituation.- ll9
State Department officials were a180 disappointed in
their hope that a freely elected government would lead to a
quieting of internal unrest, for simultaneous with Congres.
sional unre.t was the threat of an armed in.urreotion by
I

Quirico Weliu, the Governor ot Puerto Plata.

Acting on

,

reports that linked the .coUllarel Arias with Feliu, Secre
tary ot State aryan instructed the AIlerican Minister SulliI

va to ••• ure JiMna. of continued 8upport and to intorm
ll8W• ll•• , oe.cit., II, pp. 749-50.
l19 Munro , op.cit., p. 297.

72

the dissident leader. that they would be held personally
responsible for any attempt they might make to embarrass
the government.

In his cable to Sullivan, the Secretary of

State further stated thatl
This Government means what it ••id when it sent
a commis.ion there with a proposal looking to
permanent peace and it will live up to the pro
mis.s it has made. • • • !he changes advised B.e.
the reforms d.aandem are the reforms necessary for
the honest and .fficient administration of the
Government and the early and proper development of
the country. There should be no unnece.sary delay,
therefore, in putting them into operation..
• A
naval force will be sent whenever necea.ary.l~O
Ultimately, the threatened revolt in Puerto Plata was headed
off, but it need be noted that negotiations only became
successful when the U.S.S. Castine anchored in the harbor
off Puerto Plata with a large body of American Marines
aboard.
A problem of a different nature aroa. in April when
Sullivan reported that the Dominican Congress had initiated

,

impeacbaant proceedings against President Jimenez for his
failure to dismiss Johnston as oontroller.

Congressional

hostility toward Johnston was activated by his decision to
auspend payment on a number of superfluous budgetary ite.a
aubmitted in March by the Dominican Senate and by the; atteapt
of Clarence H. Baxter, the General Receiver, to set up a
civil service system within the receivership.

The need for

the Dominican Government to live Within its income was
l20poreigft Relations, 0e.ait., 1915, pp. 279-80.
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appareft~

to informed Ob.er.era, .. vaa the need for a more

orderly arrange.ant within the receivership, but Congre.s
had twice refused JohDaton'. appoint..Dt and stood on fira

,

Constitutional ,round in it. attack against Jimenez for his
failure

~o

follow Con,re••lonal 4ictat...

Secretary of

State Bryan, upon nceiving' word of the proceeding. and
t:be report

tha~

certain _8lbera of th. Doainioan Congre••

hoped to in.tall Ari.. a. Provi.ional

instructed Sullivan to infora

tho..

Pre.i4en~,

i..-diately

involved that .a.hington

would I1Ot •
• , •• pera1t any attaok to be . .de upon Pre.ident
Jt.jne. for acting in good,faith toward. the United
State. • • • p...ident J1..ne. • • • ia entitled
to aDd vil1 receive from this Goveraaeat any a ••ia

taJaca that w1ll be necea.ary to OO1Ip8l reapect for
hi. "".lniat.ratloD. n i . 8upport will. be ,ivan
whether the attack. -.d8 UPOllabi. ue direot or
indinct, opeD OJ:' in .ecret. l 1

The Secretary of S1:ate' . . . . .aga had t.mediate effect
aD

the Dominican Congre.. and !apeachaent proceeding. againat

I
JiMne.
ware, for the t1ale being, abandoaed I

but a danger

oua aoura. of policy had. been ••t into motion, foJ:' Secr_
tHy Bryan

had ooap1.te1)' ignored the r4CJht of lapeaom.nt

given the Doainican Congre•• by the Dominioan Constitution
and -had pa••ed the .ta9& when he con.i481.'ed t.bat the 4mea
tic affain of the DoIIiniaan "public were other than a
ut.tar for t.be 801e ctet.end.natlon of the DepartMnt of

l21pozeil! Belationa, op.cit.., 1915, pp. 283-.4.
122. .11•• , !Reoit., II, p. 752.

s...~
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The oontrovez.y whieb involved United State. control
over the appointmant of all c.-tams officials va. .ettled
IICr_ amicably by a Dominica oa.li••iOll whioh _ t with

Pr.sident WilsOD and Secretary Bryan in the latter part
of April.

They were .amly 9reete4, and although the State

Departaent .too4 fira in iD8i.tiD9 on adhennce to the 01:'i9

inal lt07 agreement whiob 9aYe the. ultiaate power ovar the
appoiD~t

of cu.toaa peEsonnel, theyt

• • • .oupt
to

JoIm.~n

to _et the DoIliIlicaD' s objections
by traa.forriD. to the ouato_ neeiv

er.bip .oat of the dutie. of the controlloE. John
.t:on hi...lf vu to have a po.t in the recei".rahip,

..o::t:!:iI3

:!~4-:0;n::r;::::!i:l-:::l::;~; :::t~

Rot _pectin, .uoce••, the Doa1nlcaa

C~

••io_l:'. vere

pl....d wit.h the ne" arraageaent and .ailed for Santo DoIIda
CJO to celebrate one of their few 41p1omatic viaunr1e••
A8 the

au.aer~:of

1'15 approaohed there vere 819D1fl

cant ahU988 . .de in State Department peraonnel.

In May,

Sullivan waa compelled to r ••i9D and in June, Secretary of
State aryan turned over the rein. of leader.hip to Robert

LaDsing_

As early a.

Deoembe~

1914, president Wil.on had

been informed of oertain iaproprieti.. on the

p~rt

of Sul

livan and had appolated Senator J . . . . D. Phelan of Cali
fornia to In.... t19'.t.. the allegatlons.

Tbe pn.. 1188dl..

ately be,aR to .xplore the ch.r,e. a,.inst. Sullivan and
123MuRro, op.cit., p. 301.

7S
.0

damaged hi. image that any credibility be might have

had was soon loat.

The coup

2! irace waa

delivered when

Senator Phelan releaaed hia finding. on Nay 8, 1915.

Sum

marizing hi. report, the Senator took into account an
a1l8,8d bribe wbich wa. offered to a State Department offi
cial who had inve.tigated Sullivan'. iaproprietie••
I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doUbt
that Mr. Sullivan fully realiz.d the gro.s•••• of
the impropriety of hi. proposition, but I aa sat
isfie4 because of hi. propoSition that he i . not
a PZOD4U: penon to hold the position that be doe.
hold. 124

Sullivan haa remained at hi. po.t for over four months
before hi. resignation, and on• •u.t agree with Dana G.
MUnro'. stat.ment tbat it was indeed -extraordinary that the
American government should have atteapted for .everal month.
to deal witb so potentially dangerouB a situation throuqh

a repre.entative who vas completely diaeredited.- l25
During the summer of 1915 the political atmosphere in
the Dominican Republic once again bec... charged.

Local

rebellions by di.affected provincial l.ader. flared anew aDd

de., by General ••n6n OYaodo in

by July an insurrection b••

the Province of San hd:r:o de Macori. tbreat.eaed to engulf
the tiny ..public in

revolutl~D.

At this juncture, Pr••lcieIE

I

Ji_nez suffered a pbysical and mental breakdown and w••
oblipd to turn the rein. of governmental control over to bill

l24ouoted in Kni9bt, 22.c1t., p. 65.
l25Munro , gp_cit., p. 301

,I
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sharply divided

cabin.~.

Senaing the a.riousn••• of the

aituation, Secretary Lansing instructed the American Charge
d' Aff.ires on July 21 to infora tho•• principally involved

in the diaturbances that if

i~

"'0_ necessary to

AMerican 801diers to establiab order be would
to do

80.

,

land

no~ b.81~.te

General Boracio Vaaquez, •• leader of the oppos1

tioD, quickly ••• erted his party's d.sire for peace, but in
an open me..... to Lansinq h. declared that.

I believe that the peace of the country o.n
firmly established not by troops but throuqb
good and respected institutions• • • • MOreover,
I do not believe that preaident Wi180n haa the
right, under any pretext., to infringe the aov
areiqnt.y of an indepeDdent. people • • • I oonsider
aa indispensable both re.pect for public liber
ti.. and for the l.w on the part of the Govern
ment iD19fder to attain the enda wbich we 80 much
desire.

be

The situation remained tOUChy until the Fall montha when

,

Ji. .aea once again resumed his post and quieted the revo
lutionary l.adera by distributing among
building contract. and appointments
the government.

to

th..

numerous road

positiona within

Politically, tbe aituat.ion waa, for the so

_at, in hand but such a ·we.k and teaporizin9 policy· could
only le.d to future diffioulti.a. 127
The chan,e. in State DepartaeDt personnel had, for •
fle.t.ing . ,. .nt., given ria. to speculation &IIOng Dominicus

126Qgotea in ••11•• , oe.cit., II, p. 756.

l27:roreie Relationa, 0e_cit., 1915, pp. 292·95.

r
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that

~rican

foreign policy adg'ht be 80ftenad to allow the

Dominican government more le.way in her cOD9res.ional
activiti•• and that the Convention of 1'07 might be reinter
preted so a. to give Dominicans more

tur...

~ontrol

over

eXp8ndi~

Dominican. soon found out, however, that a1thoug'h

a chang'e had occurred in American repre.entation, there was
to be DO chanqe in American policy, indeed, Secretary of
State Lan.ing .ouqbt -to

re.ffi~

the policy gradually .aul

ded by Secretary Bryan with the at l . . .t tacit approval of
Pre.ident Wil.on, • • • (!nd undert.oo~ to obtain for the

Uaited Stat•• an eYen greater ...sure of oontrol._ 128
Becaus. of the continuing di.order withi. the Republic
and the fe.ling among many State Department officials that
financial direction of Dominican affairs

W&8

neces.ary to

prevent recurriDq revolutions, Seoretary Lansing ia Sept...
beX'

iasu-ucted William w.

au••ell,

the new Allerican Mini.tar,

to iafora the DoIdnicen Government that 1tva. increa.inC]
ita public debt in violation of the 1907 Convention.

aua.ell

waa also told to convey the fact to the DoaiaicaD Government

that $7,000,000 dollars of public indebtedn••• had been
CIOntzaoud without united States approval and that if the
original object. for which
we~e

to

~e

COnvention had been secured

be upheld future violation. of the Treaty could

be allowed.

not

In cODDection with Secretary Lansing' • •tatement

l2Iwe ll•• p op.cit., II, p. 758.
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it auat be reaeabere4 that in July the neighbori., repub1io
of Baiti had been placed under United States ailitary occu
pation.

The ocaupatioD of Haltlwou1d bave far reach1n,

consequences for Dominicans fori

• • • the ..I tate DepartaeJlt'. 14... of what OU9ht
to be done UD the Doadnlcan 1lep\1b1iil took delinite
ahape after tbe intervention in Sait.i forced the
American gOYerDment to formulate a relatively 4e'
ini te program tor that cOUDtry. '!'be provis1ons of
the treaty with aaiti bad their origin largely in
the State Depart.ent's experieace in Santo Domin,o,
ad tbe . .in feat.ures of the treat.y now bec_
abjectlye. of Amerioan policy in that cOUDtry.13t
What Lanalng hoped for was the adoption of a new oon
vention which would be similar to the one recently conoluaed
with aaiti; with

p~viaiODs

for a land aurvey to facilitate

taxation, for a oonstabulary he.ded. by Americans, for a
core of Aaerioan engineers

to

ovane. public works and

SaD

ltation, and for the approYal of a finucia1 advi.er "ho
would have the ultiaat. deci.ion in budgetary .attera.

If

an." treaty ,could not be aecured, Lansing instructed aua
••11 to aelYi.e the Doat.nican fovel'l'll8ent that under the teru
of the 1907 ConY.atioa the UDite4 Statea had the 1e9al right
tol

(1) oa.pel the ob••rYation of Article III of the con

ftDtion ill the appointDmt of a fiDaBcia1 advi•• r and, (3) to
provide for the free coura. of oustoms by the cre.tioD of
• con.tabulary.l30
l2'Munro, 02. a it., p. l02.

ll0PoreifD Relationa,

22,01t.,

1915, pp. 321-25.
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Doaialcan governmental leadera almost unanl.ou.ly
rej.cted the thou9ht of ratlfy1nq eo odious

aD

agreement

a. had been aocepted by Halti and protested vehemently ;
against WaahiDfton'. interpretation of the 1907 COnvention.
Lansing, for the time being, dld not pres. for acceptance

of a new treaty but dld insiat on DoaiDlcan acceptance of
a financial adviaer aDd the creatlon of • Constabulary.

UDder such cirauaatance. Jt.ene.' po.ltioD •• Pr••ident waa
particularly preoariou..

the one .1de, Arias w•• con

On

.tantly intrlgu1Dg again.t the ailin9 executlve in the hope.
of r.placing hi. a. Provisional pre.ident, and although

,

Ji..... did

po.....

a coterie of loyal and abie official.

be n.eded financial •••istance in the form of loan. to main
tain hl.·- ada1niatration.

'fhi. the stat. Departaent was un

willj.nC] to allow unl••• th.ir &tauds re,ardin9 the Conven

tion of 1907 wer.

_t.

Bv.nt. c... to • head on April 14, 1'16.

With the

aid of the vel'aque. faction in his Cabi••t, J~Dez co....
aitted himaelf to a cour•• of actian d••igned to l ••••n
the bfl••noe of Aria., who at. the t.ime was Minister of

War.

General c..area Jim6n.z, Chi.f of the Ratio_l Guard,

and Qeneral Mauricio JiMBea, Co.aan4er of the forces

t.ioaed in the capital,

"1:'.

.ta

aaa.oned to • aMIl .at.at. a

f.w .tle. froa the capital vbere they w.re arrested for
disloyalty to the gov.rnmeat

an.

for venality iD their

80

offlcial dutles.

,

Aria. was also summoned for an interview

with Jimenez, but was alerted to the fact that hls chief
lieutenaata wer. under arrest.

Believing iacarearatioD

awaited hlm, ha h••ded for the fortre.s in Santo Domingo
where be ahut himself up w1th troopa loyal to hls person.
withln a abort time the remainder of the arR¥ along with the
aajor opposition parties declared for Aria..

Hoping to bead

off a general rabellioa:, the American Mird.ster SullivUl
joined with Archbisbop Houel in an effort to reach some
of cOilpromis. with Ari...

~

Unfortunately for all parties

CODoarDea, no aqr....nt va. reached.

By May 1, it was rec

ognized that the break between Arias and Jtmenez was a per
.anent one.

Contrassional allies of Arias lmpeacbed

Jl~

and he in turn d1sl11.sea Arias froa hi. Cabinet position.

In a rare display of aecislven.ss, J~nea collected
about ht. 1500 troops which wer. supplied by ProviDclal
governor. stll1 loyal to hi. and marched

to

the outskirts

of Santo Doaingo where he . .nt envoy. to Aria. 4e.an4inq
bi. t..8dlate surrender.

Fearinq a po.sible ..iaure of the

Presidency by the Germanophile Arlas, Secretary Lansing
I

urged Jia8nez

to

reque8t the •••istance of United states

MariDes who haa conveniently stationed th....lv.. in Santo
Domingo harbox aboard the
Castine.

~be

u.s.s.

Prairie aDd the U.S.S.

DoaiDioaD executive at first ••emed will1nq

to auaaon AaerioaD Marines, but after considerable debate

he concluded that the Doa1nlcan people would oppose foreigD
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tcoopa on their 80il

and

modified his position by

only for arma and ammunition for hi_ troops.

a.~in9

In a decislon

which aut be qua_tJ..oned, Lansing inforaed the American
I

Minister that Jimenez must re.triot hia8elf to ••king only

for the support of American troops.
In the Mantiae, American Marin.s were landed osten

sibly to protect the Asarican Legation and the Haitian
.Le9ation, which wu serving a8 a refuge for fOl:e19ners.
I

J1aenaa Meided to pr.s. the attack, but a shortage of 1li1i

tarr supplies prevented h1. taking the capital.
".ponden~t

Row totally

be .eked tbe American forces to take the city tor

him, but wi thin a . .ttar of hour. he withdrew this request
and resigned. l3l By reaignin9, he hoped to .scape re.pon.i
bility for the ever growing number of Marine. being landed

without his peZ1ll1tJsion.

In an addre.. to the nation he,

announoed that,

• • • 1 .01....1y declare that I hold the sonaw
ful 008910tion Chat an azaad eDcounter between . ,
force., thos• .00 are upftol41Dg the Constitution,
and tho.. vbiab occupy t:he rebel stronghold of the
CApital of Santo DoIBiD90 would inevltably bring
as • re.ult ~:\,hWli1i.tloD of a Worth Aa8r1can
intenention. • • • since the authors of the
do' atat • • • wen dJ..po••d to destroy the lIa· on

lIUP

i'atliiF'"th&n renounce their lust for power, the
P• •idut. "u forced to _1eet. ODe of t.wo alterna
ti...... e1ther 'to retu:n to the Pre.ide.tial Man
slon _n9 rub. to enjoy a power rtl9aiDed for bJ.a
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by foreign bulleta, or hi. OVD iaInolation• • • •
with the whole country at my aide •• •
with
draw to the .erenity of a tranquil home. 32

f

Instead of preventing

furt:her~

American military inter

vention, J~n.z' resignation resulted in an increaae in
the nWllbar of troops .tationed outside the aapital.

CongJ:ee

aional leadere loyal to Arias were alarmed at the pres.noe

of American force. so near the capital and aent the follow
in9 . . . .age to President wils01l1
'!'he transport 'nirie baa auived w1 th troopa,
but the oo.tDican people ha.. confideaae that
the•• troops will not be uBed by any . .ana to
iIluden with the free aation of ow: institu
tions. 'fhe Leg-ialat1 ve Power of this country i .
respon.ive to the a_a. ot the whole 00WltJ:y and
cla1. . fut~3re.ponsibility for its institutions
and lawa.

athttr Frateata follawed but wen of no avail, a. the nWlber
of "rine8 was incre. . .4 .till further with the 8rrival of
Rear AcJairal W.8. Caperton aboard the U.S.S. Dole!!in.
I
ODce Jt.eDe.'
re8i9nat10n appeared final secretary

Laa.ill9 ext.eAded tul1 control to JUniatar .....11 as to what
aotioa.s ahould be taken and •• to bow AMricu troop. ware
to be

ueel.

Con.tit.utionally, execut.i". power reJU.J.ae4 in

the hucl. of :.:the cabinet u.ntil •

therefore,

Ruu&~ll

deci4ad

~o

D_

Preaident .as chosen,

recogni•• ita authority.

In

ConjllDct.iOD with his recotnition of the Doadnioan Cabinet

132Ji~•• ' proclamation of May 7, 1'16 i . quote4
in .alle., ge_cit_. II, pp. 7"·70.
l33Quote4 in .elle., OR_cit., IX, p •• 771.
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Russell also resolved to clear the capital of the rebels
under the command of Arias.

He instructed Caperton to take

the necessary action and on May 13th the Admiral advised
Arias that the United States would support the constituted
authorit.y of the Republic and that if the revolutionaries
had not surrendered Santo Domingo by six o'clock on the
morning of the 15th, American forc•• would move to disarm
the insurgents.

Fortunately, Arias avoided bloodshed and

on the night of May 14th moved hi. troops to the interior.
The next morning Caperton's forces entered Santo Domingo
and a military ocoupation was proclailled.

Proclaiming the

capital occupied, Caperton addre••ed the following message
to its citicensl
I. OWing to the conditions that have existed
in and uound this City in ooa.equaee of the
fact that rebels in arms have taken possession of
the City, exolud.tnq therefrOJa the Constitutional
officials of the Government, and att.er all means
te arri". at. a peaceful ••tt.l_ant. of the situ
ation had been exhausted, it beoame necesaary to
have the City occupied by forc•• of the United
States of America.
II. Notiee is hereby given to the oitizens of
Santo Domingo that the foroes ot the United States
of America have assumed oontrol of this City.
III. All the inhabitants are requested to stay
in the City and cooperate with me and ray repre
sentatives in protecting life and property and
maintaining order.

IV. All public Officials are ask.allY re••in
at their posts and cooperate with me.
134 pOre ign Relations, 0R,.oit., 1916, p .. 228.
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Dominican. were naturally resentful of the American pre.enoe
in Banto Domingo and became somewhat hostile when Caperton

ordered the principal oities of the interior occupied as
we11. 135 Little did Dominicans know that this was only
the first step in an occupation that would last a full
eight years.
In the eyes of many Dominicans, Arias had baen dis
credited by hi. cowardly exit from Santo Domingo, but this
did not keep the Congress from attempting to .ecure his
eleotion as President.

With the troubl.a()m8 interior al. .t

occupied, the Amerioan Minister Rua••11 decided the time

was propitious to press for the reforms that the state
Department had for

80

long advocated.

To implement the

long sought after reforms, however, Russell had first to
block the election of Arias.

ae -suggested- to the Domini

can Congress that they delay their ohoice of a Provisional
President until more normal conditions prevailed within
the Republic.

The Dominican legislators, however, refueea

to adjourn, but being realists in an occupied country, they
decided the election of Arias would be wholly unpractical

and immediately started the search for a compromise candi
date.
On

May 23rd, both the Houae of Deputies and the Senate

had agreed on the aelection of Dr. Pederico uenr!quea y
135poreiin Relations, op.cit., 1916, p. 227.
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Car'lVajel a. Provisional 're.iclent.

Ru•••l1 and Caperton,

however, .oved co prevent final aotion on hi. nomination.

They did .0 beea••• of hi. friendship with Arias and becau.e
he

refu••d to enter into any pre_laction .gr....nt. which

would guarantee Waebington the latitude in policy which
so many

~

ranking State Department official. were

a••an

diD9_

Ru••• ll .uggested to Washington that .ome of the

lIOn

.ili tant S.nators be p1aoed under arrest in order to

block the elecUon of HenrIque..

Wa.hington vetoed Rua.el!s

.Q9geatioa aDd in.tructed hi. to infor. the Contre.. that
any ua.ati.factory gov.rnment would not be aooorded recog
nition, 84 that DO austo. . reV.Due. would be released for

it. uinbmuH.

Independ.ntly of

au••ell's action,

,

the

COUnoil of Mini.t.r., UDder the leader.bip of Vela.quez,

inoarc.ratecl aeVeD of Aria.' aupporter. in

.u..

aD

atte.pt to

off t:be eleotioD of . . Boraeiata aa Pn.iden't.

Ra

••11 i_cU.ately obt.ained ~ir nlea•• , but &enrtque.
thought the plot had been instigated by the Unit.d State.
to threateD the Dominican Cong-re...

Henrique. va., bow.... r,

.hrewd enough to oosprehend the fate which await.d hi. a.

Pr•• i4en~ and in a ....., . to the people he declin.d the
Pre.id.ntial nomiDation and hurled &bUB.. at the United

State. for iaterlering in Dominioan politic••
Wi th Henrique. out of the renint', the DOminican

S••ate BOv.d quickly to .ecure th. election of Jacinto de
C••tro,

aD

014 follower of Gen.ral

vuquea.

ft. Bou.e of
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Deputi•• , however, blocked hi• • lec~ion because of hi.
affiliation with the Horaeiate party, and once more a dead
lock wa. produced.

In the meantime, the occupation of the

Cibao became complete with the surrender of Arias at San
tiago on July 6th.

In a ••• a,8 to the Doainican people

Caperton deolared that.
It is no~ the intention of the United states
Government to acquire by oonquest any territory
in the DoIdJlican Republic nor to attack ita 80V
ereignty, but our troops will remain here until
all revolutionary ao....nt. have been atamped
out and until such reforms as are deemed nece.aary
to insure the future welfare of the country haYQ
been initiated and are in effective operation.~l6
By July's end the Dominican Conqress aqreed on the
eleotion of ex-Pr••ident Archbishop Nouell.

Houell, however,

even thouqh a•• ured of Russell's support, declined the nom
ination.

By constitutional limitation Congress was due to

adjourn on July 26th.

Rather than leave the aelection of

a Proviaional President to a council of Ministers friendly
to the United State., the legislators, without consultin9
RUBsell, elected Dx. Francisco Henr!quez y Carvajal, the
brother of Dr. Federico Henr!quez y Carvajal, aa Provisional
President for a period of five months.

HenrIquez ha4 for

the past twelve year.,ieolated himself from Dominican poli

tics by taking up residence in Cuba.

Although his sympa

thies lay with the Jimenista party, Dominican leaders felt
l36porei92 Relations, o-.cit., 1916, pp. 231-32.
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he would be acceptable to Washington.

Hope soon turned to

dismay, however, as Russell, unable to obtain any pre
election promises, was instructed to withhold official reo
ognition until the new President-elect consented to all of
Washington's demands for reform.
Upon arriving in Santo Domingo, aenrLquez was informed
by

Russell that the United States would not recognize his

government unless he acquiesced in the interpretation of
the Convention of 1907 a8 outlined in earlier notes to

,

President Jimenez.

Without any further attempt to resolve

differences at the confexenoe table, Russell received

ins~

ctions to suspend all payment of Dominican revenues.

Wash

ington's actions in this matter, while reprehensible, were
designed to demonstrate to Henriquez that the United States
could and would a.sume and maintain a rigid posture until
its demands were met.

The immediate effect, however, waa

that Henriquez became intransigent and government employe.a
and local merchants found it difficult to maintain them
••lves without funds. ll7
Henr!quez remained firm, arguing that the Dominican
Constitution did not give him power to affirm a.qreements
without the consent of the Dominican Congress.

Be waa, how

ever, willing to temporarily acquiesce in the collection and
disbursement of receivership fund. and consented to the
1l7Kunro , op.ait., p. 309.
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reorqaniza~ion

of the Dominican Army if the

would allow other

La~n

Uni~.d

States

American nations to provide officers

to assist in the overhaul.

Wasbington, however, realized

the•• aqr••ments would be of a transitory nature and that

a new treaty would have to be negotiated once Henriquez'
government was accorded recognition.

What the State Depart

ment wanted was an wiron-clad w agreement that would permit
the creation of a constabulary and would a.sure United
Stat.s fiscal oontrol.

Since Henriquez' propos.ls fell

short of thia mark, tbey ware flatly refus.d.
After prolonged consultations with his advisers, Hen

riquez once more attempt.ed to reach a compromise in late
August..

A treaty was proposed which would have

9i~n

the

United States complete control o¥ar the Republic's financ.s
and would ha.. employed American Army officers under four
year

oon~acts

to reorganize the Dominican army.

~he

only

point Henriquez stood fi~ on was that. Dominican officer.
would continue to reoeive their appointments by the DominicaD
President.

AdJdral Pond, who had replaced Caperton in July,

••e.. to have been impres.ed by the•• overture.,13S but
the State Department remained intranai9ent and curtly refused
further neqotiations.
Barly in october, Russell wa. called to W.shinqton for
a conference with Secretary Lan.inq to communioate his
138 Ibid., p. 310.

-
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recommendations on future policies.

The American Minister

was for the presenting of a final ultimatum which, if
rejected, would mean that the United States would have to
-take charge- of the nation's affairs. 139 Lansing apparentJ¥
agreed with Ru••ell, for an urgent plea from Henriquez that
some solution be adopted which would not obliterate Domini
can sovereignty went unnoticed. 140
By November the State Department had lost all inter
est in any further attempts at negotiation.

Washington had

concluded that a formal military occupation was the only
remedy for the ills which plaqued the beleagored Republic.
To a large degree it was influenced by the American occu
pation of Haiti where full military control had resulted in
the adoption of a treaty that contained all the provisions
for reform that Washington wanted.

There were, however,

other equally important considerations aside from the Hai
tian experience, which help explain Washington's decision
to go ahead with a military occupation.
One of the principal reasons for State Department
intransigence oentered around the fact that the ultimate
value of any agreement would depend on the attitude of the
Dominican Congress and the President who would succeed Ben
riquez when his five month term expired.

Prospects for

139aus8e11 to Lansing, September 25, 1916 quoted in
Munro, op.cit., p. m
140we lles , op.cit., II, p. 790.
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cooperation were anything but bright.

When Henriquez was

elected, Dominican politicians had reconvened the Consti
tutional Convention elected in 1914, with a view toward
reforming the Constitution.

Prom the start there waa dis

cord within the convention.

To insure a quorum it was nec

essary for sixteen members to meet, but day after day the
Jimenistas refused to attend.

The only business accomplilhed

was the adjournment procedure.

In the absence of consti

tutional changes, the electoral colleges in several provin
ces met of their own volition and returned the electors of
1914, a majority of whom were Jimenistas.

While this action

was clearly illeqal, what bothered the State Department was
the fact that moat of the members contemplated the election
of Arias as President.

The prospect that Arias might secure

the Presidency was not contemplated with equanimity in Wash

ington.

Officials reqarded him as a political and military

bully who had extorted money from the Dominican Government
for over a quarter of a century.

Aaide from his caudillo

activities, he and many members of his party were outspokenly
pro-German. 14l In the minds of many, a government headed
by such a man presented a security risk in the Caribbean,
this Washington would not permit •
. For a time, the United States had profited by the
qeneral friendliness eXhibited toward Americans.
141Munro, op.cit., pp. 311-1 3.
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her the mood of the people had chanqed to one of open hos
tility.

During the month of September, American Marines had

gradually assumed many of the roles traditionally assigned
to the Dominican police force.

Armed patrols begaD making

arrests of Dominican citizens.

By October Russell compli

cated the situation further by ordering the arrest of sev
eral caudillos who had sacked the customhouse at La Romana
the summer before.

In an attempt to seize one of these men,

Ram6n Batista, a fight ensued which took the lives'·:of two
Marine officers.

Two days later, on October 26th, an encoun

ter with a drunken qunman in the capital resulted in the
deaths of aeveral innocent bystanders.

American military

personnel also attempted to impose a censorShip on the more
radical Dominican dailies.
-,

Such actions, while well inten

tioned on the military's part, understandably provoked the

~~.t resentment on the part of many Dominicans.

Hostil

ity toward AmerioAns was also generated by the fact that fOr
four months Washington had suspended all payments to the
Dominican government.

The suspension of salariea to govern

mental agencies and employees had brought about an intoler
able economic situation which had left many Dominicans des
titute.
By the middle of November, Secretary Lansing realized
that the situation was fast approaohing a crisis.

on

Novem

ber 14, Henriquez had requested that the electoral colleges
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choose new .enators and deputies to replace those whose
terms had expired.

The State Department feared the elec

tion of Arias after evaluation of the situation, and decided
that immediate action was nece.sary.

on November 22, 1916,

Secretary Lansing expressed his fear of weconomic disaster
and -impending revolution w within the Republic, citingl
• • • the fact that the Provisional Government
will not meet the views of the United States in
regard to ,the establishment of financial control
and the constabulary, brings the Government of
the United States face to face with a serious prob
lem.. • • The wi thholdinq of the funds by the
United States Government on account of the fact
that recognition has not been qranted to Henriquez
has broQqht an economic crisis in the country
which is daily growing worse and for which this
Government would not wish to be placed in such a
position that it would be held responsible • • • •
It is thought that the only solution of the dif
ficulty would be the declaration of martial law
and placing of Santo Domingo under military occu
pation, basing this on the interpretation which
the United States has given to the Dominican Con
vention of 1907 and a180 upon the present unset
tled conditions in the Republic • • • Captain Knapp
~ • • is understood to have arrived today in Santo
Dominqo and it is believed that no time should be
lost in instructing him to put into effect the
proclamation declaring military control and to
commence immsdiateil2the disbursement of funds
under martial law.
When President Wilson replied to Lansing'. memorandum
on November 26, 1916, his thoughts were elsewhere.

As Sum

ner Welles points out.
The immense upheaval which had resulted from the
outbreak of the World War, the constantly increaskg
l42poreign Relations, 0E.cit., 1916, p. 241.
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evidence that the United State. might not be per
mitted to re..in aloof, and the activities of hi.
own electoral campaign, had made it increasingly
difficult during the preceding year for President
Wil.on to devote much attention to the Dominican
situation. The successive step. which had been
taken during the summer months, while duly reported
to him, had doubtle.. not impreased them.elves upon
hi. in their full gravity, since his mind had bJ43
now become engrossed with the European problem.
In approving the military occupation, Wilson did, how
ever, strike from the proclamation the sentence which would
have authorized the officer in charge to remove any Domini
can judge conaidered unfit.

Wilson'. reply to Secretary

Lansing read aa follows.
It is with the d••pest reluotance that I approve
and authorize the course here propo.ed, but I am
convinced that it ia the lea.t of the evila in
sight tn thi. very perplexing situation. I there
fore authori.. you to i.sue the nece••ary instruc
tion. in the pr. .i ••••
I have stricken out the sentence in the pro
po.ea proclamation which authorized the commanding
officer to remove judg•• and other. in certain
cirOWllBtano... It may be nece••ary to re.ort to
.uch .xtre. . . .asur•• , but I do not d••• it wi.e
to put .0 arbiHtry an announce.nt in the prl'cla
aatioD itself.
Senriquez met with Captain B.S. Knapp, who had re
placed Admiral Pond in November, in a tinal interview on
November 28, 1916,but nothing was accompli.hed.

Th. next

day a military occupation was procla1aed, which in the word. of
143.. 11e., op.cit., II, p. '92.
l44roreign Relations, op.cit., 1916, p. 242.
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Sumner Welles.
• • • officially disregarded the existence of a
Dominican Government established, in aocordance
with the Dominican Constitution, by the Dominican
people, in the exercise of the rights inherent in
them as a aovereign nati9n, a nation which had main
tained its liberty and independence against every
menace and against overwhelmi~~ odds during the
preceding seventy-two years.
The official proclamation based the intervention on
the Dominican government's violation of Article III of the
1907 Convention.

It was stated that the occnpation was

undertaken ·with no immediate or ulterior object of destroy
ing the sovereignty of the Republio· but rather was designed
·to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of
internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of
the treaty aforesaid, and the obligationa resting upon it
as one of the family of nations.· 146 Almost a week later,
the Dominioan Minister in Washington, Ar.mando P'rez Perdomo,
filed an official protest.

At the time, Perdomo's protest

received little attention, but as the last official act of
an occupied

natio~

the words today carry a poignant me.sage.

Be stated that.

A state of war which alone could have justified
such a proceeding on the part of the Government of
the United States toward the Dominican Republic
has never existed between the two Nations.
And therefore by acting as it has with the Domin
ican RepubliC, Your Excellency's Government plainly
l45welles, op.cit., II, p. 793.
146poreign Relations, op.cit., 1916, pp. 246-47.
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violated in the first place, the fundamental prin
ciples of public international law which laid down
as an invariable rule of public order for the
nations the reciprocal respect of the sovereignty
of eaoh and every one of the other states of the
civilized world, and in the second place, the prin
Ciples which guide the doctrine of Pan-Americanism
which hallow the inviolability of American national
ities, principles which may be said to have found
their highest virtues in the many official declar
ations ~'7the learned President of the United
States.

l47Dominican Minister Armando Perez Perdomo's protest
delivered on December 4, 1916 is quoted in Walles, 0E.cit.,
II, p. 796.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Drawn by the lucrative trade prospects of the Carib
bean in the later part of the eighteenth century, the United
States 800n found herself playing an active role in the
affaira of Hispaniola
teenth century.

durin9~he

early years of the nine

United States involvement deepened with

the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 when Wash
ington committed herself to a policy deaigned to prevent
European incursion into the Western Hemisphere.
Bncouraged by Dominican politicians who feared Hai
tian conquest, the United States flirted with the idea of
annexation during the 1850·s.

Civil War cut short the.e

notiona, but the Spanish occupation, although a failure,
aroused a greater determination on the part of Washington
that the island Republic should never again be dominated by
a Buropean power.

This determination led to a policy of

annexation by the Grant administration which favored United
States expansion in the Caribbean.

Congress, however, did

not accept the arqument that expansion was necessary to pre
vent European encroachment, and the proposals of Preaident
Grant were defeated.
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Althouqh expansionist projects were henceforth
viewed with disfavor, Washington still insisted that Rure.
pean powers be excluded fro. the caribbean.

When DOlItinioan

il'uSebt.ednes8 led to the threat of possible Buropean inter
vention, Pre8ident Theodore Roosevelt moved swiftly to block
any expansionist desips European powers m1ght have enter

tained.
roe

With the promulgation of hi. Corollary

Doctr~

he

to the Mon

wa. able to forestall any European advance

in the Caribbean by establishing a austoma receivership
whioh .atisfied foreign

cred1to~.

and maintained the Domini

can Republic'. sovereignty.
Roosevelt had hoped his policies would bring peace to
the Dominican "publiC, but by 1912 it became evident that

aucb hopes were not

to be

realized.

Presideat Wilson ad

hered to the established policy in regards to Buropean expeD
aion in the caribbean but brOadened the role of the United
State. in the domestic polici.s of the nominioan Republic
by insiating on the establishment of a constitutional
democracy, whioh in his llind was'.nec.s.ary
~l.

\

endl••s cycle of revolution.

to

put an end to

If the Dominicans oould

but learn the ways of democracy, he r ...one4, then the cha
otic conditions which invited foreign encroachment would
ceas. to exlat.

When it became apparent that delIIOoracy

v.a Dot so ••sily ia4uced, Wilson took the final a.p anel

&ant United States Marin.s to oocupy the Republic and instruct

,.
the DoIa1Aica. in tlle .ays of -.ocracy.
III _lUI, Oni ted St.at.e_ ia_i_tAmee t.hat. the DoJainican

Republio aut ......r be 40aWlated by a Buropean power encour

aged a variet.y of foreign policy decisions d.signed
acbieve this end.

to

Depending on the ideolog-ical bent of the

administration in power, the.e aecisions ranved from

att.~

at outright annexation and financial control to a military
occupation.

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
As the scope of this reading list ia ...11, the
concerned student who wishes to explore facets of Domini
can history other than the one presented in this thesis
would do well to consult other bibliographical aids, the
.,st i1BpOrt.ant of which are the following.

Samuel F. Bellis

and Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide to the Diplomatic Historx
of the United States, 1775-1921

(Washington, 1935, re

printed 1959), a saholarly compilation of staggering pro
portions.

H.B.B.

Mayer, List of Referenc.s on the

Monroe

Doctrine (Washington, 1919) and Phillip Bradley, Bibliog
raphy of the Monroe Doctrine, 1919-29
tain the more important materials

Q~

~London,

1929) COD

to that time.

Mater

ials of more recent date may be obtained by consulting J.P.
Harrison, Guide to Material. on Latin America in the

.~

tional Archives (Waahington, 1961).
Useful bibliographical tools, other than those as
sociated with foreign relationa, are R.A. Humphreys' Latin
American Histort.

A Guide to the Literature in Bn,lish

(London, 1958), .specially u.eful to the student unacquain
ted with Latin Aaerica, and the always beneficial Pan Amer
ican Union's Index to Latin American .eriodical Literature,
1929-1960 (Boston, 1962).
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Tbe student wbo wishe. to peruse recently written
material. on the Dominican Republic would do well to aon
suit the Handbook of Latin American Studies (Cambridge and
Gainesville, 1936-), Public Affairs Information Service
(Mew

York, 1915-), and the Reader's Guide to Periodical

Literature (New York, 1900-).
Dominican history ha. suffered neglect botb within
it. borders and abroad.

Censorsbip under a number of
/

dictators, ranging from Bae. to Trujillo, has reduced the
number of worthwbile Dominican studies to a trickle, wbile
••terials written abroad by exiles are almeat tapessible
to obtain.

By far, the best history in Englisb of the

Dominican Republic covering the pre-Trujillo period is
Samner Welle.' Naboth' a Vineyard I

Tbe Dominican Republic,

1844-1924 (2 vol., New rork, 1928).

Written by • justly

f.-au. diplomat, it contain. much material obtained from
Dominican writers .s well .a fro. the archives of the State
Department of the United States.

A sympathetic view of

Dominican history i. pre.entad by Otto Schoenrich, Santo
Domingo.

.. eountry With a Future (New fork, 1918).

Read

able surveys whicb include . .tarial on Trujillo are Selden
Rodman, QuisreXa, a Hi.tory of the Dominican Republic

(Seattle, 1964), Rayford W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican
Republic (New York, 1968), and John Bdwin Paqq, CUba, Baiti,
and the Dominican Republic (Enqlewood Cliffs, 1965).
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Mary Treudley, The United Stat.s and Santo Domingg,
1789-1866 (Worcester, 1916, reprinted from Journal of Race

Development, VI, July and October 1916, pp. 83-145, 220-74),
Charles Callan Tan.ill, The United States and Santo Domingo,
1798-1873, a Chapter in Caribbean Diplomaet (Baltimore, 193.,
and C.C. Hauch, -Attitudes of Porei9n Governments towarda

-

the Spanish Reocoupation of the Dominican Republic,- Bia
panic Amerioan

Hi~torical

Review, XXVII (1947), pp. 247-68,

are the m.jor studiea in nineteenth century Dominican dip
lomatic history.

Rayford

W.

Logan, The Diplomatic Relationa

of the United States with Baiti, 1776-1891 (Chapel Bill,
North Carolina, 1941), L.L. Montague, Haiti and the United
States, 1714-1938 (Durham, North carolina, 1940), and C.L.R.
Jame8, The Black Jacobina.

Toussaint L' OUverture and the

San Domingo Revolution (Hew York, 1963) are valuable for
the period before 1844.
Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in
the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964) ia a .uperior
analysis of early twentieth century Dominican-United Stat.s
relationa.

Its value is enhanced by the fact that Munro

was given aoa••• to state Department files.
rely in

larg~

part on printed material such

Studies which
a8

welles'

"olu. and PoraiS!! Relations are Grab. . B. Stuart, Latin
America and

~e

United States (New

York~

1943), Wilfrid

Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean poliSX of the United State.,
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1890-1920 (Baltimore, 1942), and Chester Lloyd Jones, The
Caribbean Sinoe 1900 (New York, 1936).
Valuable summaries of United State. foreign polioy
in the Caribbean may be obtained by consulting J. Lloyd
Macham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations
(New York, 1965) and J. Fred Rippy, Tbe Caribbean D&n9!r
lone (New fork, 1940).

~

In connection with United States

use of the Monroe Doctrine the reader should not overlook
the volume hy Dexter Perkins entitled A Histo£X of the Mon
roe Doctrine (Boston, 1955).
PUndamental SOurces used in the preparation of this
theais include Paeers Rel.tinS to Foreij2 Relations of the
United States, with the annual . .ssage of the 'resident to
Congr••s, generally known as Porei9n

Relation~

(Washington,

1862-) and James D. Richardson's A Compilation of the Mea
~ag.s

and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (20 vola, New

York, 1917).

Ulysses S. Grant in his Personal Memoirs

of Ul18••• S. Grant (2 vols, New York, 1885) details his
plana for the Dominican RepubliC, while Joseph Bucklin
Bishop,in the volume. entitled Theodore Roo.evelt and Hia
Time Shown in His Own Lettera (2 vola, Rew York, 1920), dem
onstratea Rooaevelt's anti-annexationist attitude..

Prob

ably the best study of Boosevelt'. action. in the Caribbean
during his pre.ideney is contaiDed in Boward C. Bill, Roose
velt and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1927).

Studiea relating
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to the establishment of a customs receivership include
eeveral article. by Jacob H. Hollander, the moat important
of whicb ia -The Readjustment of San Domingo's Financee,·
guarterly Journal of Economics, XXI (May, 1907), pp. 405-26.

J. Pred Rippy discus.es Roosevelt's action in the Dominican
Republic in -The Initiation of the CUstoms Receivership in
the Dominican Republic,· Hiaeanic American Historioal

Re~,

XVII (1937), pp. 419-57.

Studi.. of the military occupation may be obtained
by

r.ading Carl Kel.ey,

~he

American Intervention in Haiti

and the Dominican Reeublic (Philadelpbia, 1922, reprinted
from Annal. of the American Acadeex of Political and Social
Science, 100, March, 1922, pp. 109-200) and Melvin M. Knight,
The Apericane in santo

Domingo

(New fork, 1928),which is

highly critical of Unit:ed St.at.s policy.

An

i_n•• aJIOunt

of valuable data concerning the occupation is to be found
in a Senate report entitled Hearinis on Haiti

~d

Santo

Domingo.J2 vola, 67th Congr••s, Fir.t and Second ••••ion.,
Washington, 1922).

